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I have no basis for viewing [section 2] as constitutionally
suspect and I don’t. If an issue were to arise before the Supreme Court or before the Court of Appeals, if I head back
there, I would consider that issue with an open mind in light
of the arguments. I’ve got no basis for viewing it as constitutionally suspect today and I’m not aware that it’s been challenged in that respect since it was enacted. It may have been,
but as I say, I’m not aware of it.1
— John G. Roberts, Jr.

*. Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington. B.A., 1990,
J.D., 1997, Ph.D., Political Science, 2001, University of Michigan; LL.M., 2002, Georgetown
University Law Center.
1. Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., of Maryland, to Be Chief Justice of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 317 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts, Jr., nominee, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States).
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The starting point of the analysis [was] Supreme Court
cases, and the new issue [was] presumptively decided
according to the logic that those cases expressed, with no
regard for how far that logic, thus extended, has distanced us
from the original text and understanding. Worse still, however,
it is known and understood that if that logic fails to produce
what in the view of the current Supreme Court is the desirable
result for the case at hand, then, like good common-law judges,
the Court will distinguish its precedents, or narrow them, or if
all else fails overrule them, in order that the Constitution might
mean what it ought to mean.2
— Antonin Scalia
I. INTRODUCTION
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is once again at the center of our
long-standing debate over our historical commitment to the principle
of political equality. This is a debate about both the scope of congressional power under the Reconstruction Amendments and contested
substantive questions about how to best protect the right to vote.3
These are two distinct, yet familiar, strands to students of politics
and constitutional law.
On the question of congressional powers, commentators query the
need for congressional findings, the congruence and proportionality
of the statute vis-à-vis the perceived harm, and whether the statute
under review seeks to remedy a constitutional violation (as opposed
to defining the harm itself).4 These are not new questions; they date
back to the genesis of the Act, particularly the issue of findings. As
Attorney General Katzenbach remarked in response to a question
from Senator Ervin over the scope of congressional powers to “annul”
any state law of its choosing: “I would think it is a terrible mistake,
Senator, to think that Congress can just [enact appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment] without findings of some
2. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
3, 39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
3. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2007); Nathaniel Persily, The
Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174 (2007).
4. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew Preclearance Provisions, in
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 81, 85-88 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006). The
cases that form the “New Federalism” jurisprudence include United States v. Georgia, 546
U.S. 151 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997); and Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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kind . . . . We put those into the record.”5 The issue of findings was
also at the center of the debate among the Justices over the constitutionality of the Act.6
On the substantive debate at the heart of the modern Voting
Rights Act, the questions are far more contested and elusive. For example, should Black and Latino communities demand the creation of
majority-minority districts in order to ensure the election of representatives of their choice?7 Or is it a more sensible strategy to insist
on the creation of coalitional districts, where voters of color seek
common ground with like-minded voters over their candidates of
choice, or even influence districts, where voters of color play an important—yet not controlling—role in the election?8 In specific reference to some of the most important aspects of the Voting Rights Act,
this is a debate about how to best operationalize the original promise
of the Act9 and whether such promise remains relevant in light of
changed—and clearly improved—circumstances.10 Or, more succinctly: what is the best way to maximize the electoral power of voters of color?
Overwhelming congressional majorities recently took sides in this
debate, with the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott
King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of
2006.11 The results were both predictable and disappointing. Predictability stemmed from the debate over congressional powers, as
members of Congress and myriad witnesses highlighted the need for
detailed congressional findings in support of the extension, and dis5. Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong. 100 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings] (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach,
Att’y Gen. of the United States).
6. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings, Congressional Powers, and the
Future of the Voting Rights Act, 82 IND. L.J. 99, 104-15 (2007).
7. See generally DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS (1999); Pamela S. Karlan,
Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291 (1997).
8. See generally DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS (1997); Charles Cameron et al.,
Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?,
90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794 (1996).
9. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994); CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK
INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (1993); ABIGAIL
M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING
RIGHTS (1987).
10. See Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights
Act: How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
385, 388-400 (2008); Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177,
188-96 (2005).
11. Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 4-5, 120 Stat. 577, 580-81 (2006) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (Supp. 2007)).
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cussions often looked ahead to what the Roberts Court might do
when confronted with a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the
Act.12 Disappointment followed from the resolution of the substantive
questions, as Congress did not venture far from its old script, choosing only to extend the Act’s coverage formula for another twenty-five
years while correcting some Supreme Court interpretations of the
Act it deemed contrary to its wishes for the statute.13
The next phase of this debate is now underway in both the blogosphere and the pages of the law reviews. These efforts are similarly
predictable. In the face of a recently amended statute, legal scholars
are busy doing what they have always done: making sense of the new
language of the statute while also examining whether the work of
Congress remains within established constitutional parameters.
These are important questions in their own right and this Article
does not intend to suggest otherwise. These are the micro-questions
whose answers collectively give shape to the Act—the proverbial
trees within a larger and much more important forest. The debate
over the Act has largely focused on these questions.
But the Voting Rights Act is no ordinary statute, and to treat it as
such is to miss the real lessons and insights of the Act. As enacted in
1965, the Act’s sternest provisions—or what the Court termed “a
complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting
discrimination has been most flagrant”14—would expire after five
years. This need for periodic reassessment and reauthorization has
provided Congress with a built-in opportunity to examine the Court’s
interpretations of the statute. Per its own extensions, Congress has
had four such opportunities to correct judicial interpretations or to
amend the language of the Act to better reflect the needs and electoral problems of the present. In turn, the history of the Act provides
scholars with fertile ground for examining the work of Congress and
its interactions with the Supreme Court and the executive branch.
These are the macro-questions—the forest itself. This is a far more
important and intriguing feature of the debate over the Voting
Rights Act. Before turning to questions of statutory interpretation
and constitutional law, we must first tend to the first-order institutional question: what is the Court’s disposition toward the Act and
toward Congress and the executive branch? The existing scholarship
neglects this question and fails to tap into the real insights of the Act
12. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act: An Examination of the Scope and Criteria for Coverage Under the Special Provisions of the Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5-6, 32 (2005).
13. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, On the Renewal of Section 5 of
the VRA: Why Congress Failed Voters of Color, in MAKING EVERY VOTE COUNT: FEDERAL
ELECTION LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 37 (Andrew Rachlin ed., 2006).
14. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
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and the distinct interaction between the Court, Congress, and the
executive branch.15
For example, anyone who reads the debate over the constitutionality of the Act must come away with the impression that the question for the future is whether the Act comports any longer with the
“congruence and proportionality” test established in City of Boerne.16
In response to this question, leading voices in this debate parse
through past opinions looking for relevant and seemingly controlling
passages.17 And yet, from the moment it first confronted the constitutionality of the Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,18 the Court has
blindly deferred to the work of Congress, unwilling to subject this
important statute to any meaningful scrutiny.19 The question for the
future—I suggest this is the only question—is whether such deference will continue.20 This is not a question that traditional tools of
constitutional interpretation can answer.
In contrast, this posture of deference for questions of constitutional
law differs greatly from the Court’s posture when interpreting the language of the statute. This is an area where the Court defers to no one,
even when the text of the statute or the clear intent of Congress demands a different outcome.21 In turn, Congress seldom responds to the
15. For an important exception, see J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667 (2008).
16. 521 U.S. 507, 533-36 (1997).
17. See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 3; Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on Its Side: Why
Congressional Reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent
and Proportional Response to Our Nation’s History of Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 87-94 (2006); Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending the New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349, 354-57 (2006).
18. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
19. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 283-84 (1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970).
20. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6, at 122.
21. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.
(Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 139-41 (1976);
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507 and
Title IV of S. 2029 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong. 5 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate Hearings] (“This case [Gaston
County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969)] is yet another example of the Court’s habit
of redoing the work of Congress to conform with its own notions of desirable legislation.”)
(statement of Sen. Ervin). For some of the cases, see Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 320;
Beer, 425 U.S. at 140; Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Perkins v. Matthews,
400 U.S. 379 (1971).
For criticisms of the Court’s approach in particular cases, see, for example, Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 895-97 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 935, in which Justice
Thomas stated the following: “Not surprisingly, the legislative history relied upon in Allen
also displayed the typical flaws that one might expect—it was hardly unequivocal”; Beer,
425 U.S. at 146 (Marshall, J., dissenting), in which Justice Marshall contended that “the
congressional purposes in § 5 are no longer served and the sacred guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments emerge badly battered”; and Allen v. State Board of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 583, 585 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part), in which Justice Harlan labeled Allen an “extremely broad construction of § 5,” and
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Court’s aggressive and adventurous interpretations of the Act. The
times when Congress does respond demand an explanation.
The recent case of NAMUDNO v. Holder,22 decided this past term,
follows this established script. To the uncritical and ahistorical eye,
this case reached a surprising result. But this would be a mistaken
conclusion. This challenge to the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act offered a vehicle to the conservative Justices on the Court
to bring about the fall of the Act once and for all. Judging from the
oral argument, they were poised to do exactly that.23 It appeared that
critics of the Act had finally secured five votes to strike down the statute. But this is something the Court has refused to do time and
again, even at times when a majority seemed at hand. In the end, the
Court dodged the constitutional question and decided the case on
technical statutory grounds. On both accounts, the Justices placed
themselves squarely within the history and tradition of the Act. On
the constitutional question, the Court deferred to Congress as it has
traditionally done; and on the statutory question, the Court offered a
novel reading of the statutory language, grounded not on the text of
the statute, the legislative history, or the intent or purpose of the legislature, but on its views of what the statute must mean. Again,
there is nothing new there.
In the wake of NAMUDNO, scholars will continue to focus on the
micro-questions surrounding the Voting Rights Act while ignoring
what is far and away the most important aspect of the Court’s handling of the statute: why is the Court uncharacteristically deferential
to Congress on the question of congressional powers, yet unduly aggressive when interpreting the language of the statute? This is exactly backwards. How to explain it? The real lessons and insights of the
Act and its tumultuous history are found within this as-of-yet unexamined paradox.
This Article examines this paradox in detail and offers two related
conclusions. The first conclusion looks to the “living constitutionalism” debate and the role that the Court should play in updating the

complained that “the Court has now construed § 5 to require a revolutionary innovation in
American government.”
22. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
23. See Adam Liptak, Skepticism at Court on Validity of Vote Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/us/30voting.html (“A central provision of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, designed to protect minorities in states with a history of discrimination, is at substantial risk of being struck down as unconstitutional, judging from
the questioning on Wednesday at the Supreme Court.”); see also Posting of David Gans to
Balkinization, The Voting Rights Act, the Souter Vacancy, and the Future of the Supreme
Court, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/voting-rights-act-souter-vacancy-and.html (May
19, 2009, 15:45) (“Given the repeated hostile questioning by all the Court’s conservatives –
except Justice Thomas who was characteristically silent – many commentators expect that
the Court will strike down the extension of the pre-clearance requirement.”).
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Constitution. Consider first the congressional debates in 1965 and
the fact that Congress and the administration made clear throughout
the hearings that they wished to take the substantive provisions of
the Act as far as constitutionally permissible. The Warren Court understood the congressional intent behind the Act in this manner. Relatedly, this was also a time when the Court understood the Constitution as granting Congress wide latitude to tackle the difficult question of racial discrimination then gripping the nation. Taken together, these understandings explain the Court’s expansive interpretations of the Act early on. The early cases were faithful expressions of
congressional intent buttressed by an expansive understanding of
constitutional power.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Court’s interpretations of the statute narrowed considerably. The change in the doctrine cannot be
explained by pointing to the intent of Congress, which remained consistent. Rather, this change can only be explained by the fact that
constitutional meaning ebbs and flows with the times. This is not a
static document by any means. More importantly, this argument underscores the view that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, living
constitutionalism is not reserved for the liberal Justices.
Second, this Article concludes that the Court, in line with accounts of the Justices as strategic actors and “single-minded seekers
of legal policy,”24 has played the leading role in delineating the substantive contours of the Voting Rights Act. The Act has served as essentially a placeholder—a vague and forgiving statutory canvass
susceptible to myriad interpretations—which in turn has afforded
the Justices the means by which to interpret their policy views into
the statute. And make no mistake, the Court has taken full advantage of this aspect of the statute, offering readings of the relevant
language that span the spectrum of interpretation, from strict textualist applications of the law to dynamic interpretations that would
make Bill Eskridge blush. The lesson is clear: we should stop treating the Act as no more than a paint-by-numbers exercise, as a technical and mechanical application of preexisting norms to new facts.
The history of the Act in court is far more interesting than that.
This Article examines this history in five Parts. Part II offers a
primer on the Voting Rights Act, its history and raison d’être. The
goal for this Part is quite modest in that it only seeks to provide
much needed context and grounding for the larger argument. Parts
III and IV explore the paradox at the heart of the Act. Part III focuses on the constitutional questions at the heart of the Act, while Part
IV examines the Court’s interpretations of the statutory language.
24. Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325 (1992).
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Taken together, these Parts tell a story where the Supreme Court
aggressively regulates the contours of the Act, while Congress plays
a secondary role. Part V discusses the recent NAMUDNO decision
and situates it within the history of the Act in Court. Finally, Part VI
discusses the two central lessons of the history of the Voting Rights
Act in court.
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965: A PRIMER
The Voting Rights Act was the fourth attempt by the federal government to narrow the deep chasm between the guarantees at the
heart of the Fifteenth Amendment and the reality on the ground,
where “legalisms, stratagems, trickery, and coercion”25 stood in the
way of Black enfranchisement. The first three efforts, codified in the
Civil Rights Act of 1957, 1960, and 1964, adopted what Attorney
General Katzenbach termed “the alternative of litigation, of seeking
solutions in our judicial system.”26 But these efforts fell woefully
short, as any judicial victories, secured after lengthy and expensive
efforts in court, were ultimately “tarnished by evasion, obstruction,
delay, and disrespect.”27 As the Attorney General explained during
his Senate testimony in 1965:
Our experience in the voting area has been this, that no matter
what is decided by courts, no matter what is passed by Congress in
this respect, every single place in some States, the only way you
can get compliance is to litigate and then that is defended, it is defended up through every court procedure to the Supreme Court, no
matter how clear and obvious the points, no matter how many
times those same points have been decided, until you eventually
get a decree.
Then the decree is examined carefully to see whether there is
any way in which a certain practice not explicitly prohibited by the
decree can be engaged in for the same discriminatory purposes.
When this is done, and you go back to court to get the judge to
broaden the decree, his capacity and jurisdiction to do that is litigated, then that is taken on appeal and that is taken to the Supreme Court.
When you run out of these things, the legislature enacts a new
test and that has to be litigated and appealed and go to the Supreme Court.28

A new approach was clearly needed, an approach that went
“beyond the tortuous, often-ineffective pace of litigation.”29 “What is
25. Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of
Chairman Emanuel Celler, Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
26. Id. at 5 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States).
27. Id.
28. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 41-42.
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required,” Katzenbach told the House subcommittee, “is a systematic, automatic method to deal with discriminatory tests, with discriminatory testers, and with discriminatory threats.”30 In a nutshell:
some jurisdictions could not be trusted to design fair and nonracially
discriminatory registration tests, nor could they be trusted to enforce
any such tests fairly, and simply taking such jurisdictions to court
proved insufficient. The answer would be the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.31
Three features of the Act deserve particular mention. First, the
Act provided for the appointment of federal examiners and registrars
in order to ensure that eligible voters of color would be placed on the
registration rolls and allowed to cast ballots.32 These provisions,
coupled with the Act’s suspension of literacy tests for any jurisdiction
covered under the Act’s trigger formula, were responsible for the initial surge in voting registration across the South.
Second, the Act adopted the aforementioned trigger formula for
determining which jurisdictions would be covered under the special
provisions of the Act.33 Under the formula, a jurisdiction would automatically fall within the coverage of the Act if it employed a literacy test and either its turnout rate for the 1964 presidential election
or its registration rate on November 1, 1964, was below fifty percent.34 The formula initially brought within the purview of the Act
the states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia, as well as twenty-six counties in North Carolina.
Of note, this coverage formula would be due to expire in 1970 (after
which time, the covered states and counties were free to reinstitute
their literacy tests).
Third, section 5 of the Act—which soon became known as the
heart of the Act35—required a covered jurisdiction to submit any pro-

29. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 9.
30. Id.
31. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
32. Id. §§ 3, 8.
33. The special provisions of the bill were temporary in nature. Under section 4(b), a
state would be covered under the Act if it used a literacy test as a prerequisite to vote and
its voter registration on November 1, 1964, or its voter turnout rate on the 1964 Presidential election dipped below fifty percent. Those states caught under 4(b) of the Act would
need to preclear any changes to their voting laws with a three judge District Court in the
District of Columbia. See id. § 4.
34. Id. § 4(b).
35. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R.
3247, and H.R. 3501 Before Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights, 94th Cong. 40 (1975)
[hereinafter 1975 House Hearings] (statement of Chairman Flemming, U.S. Comm’n on
Civil Rights) (contending that “[s]ection 5 of the Voting Rights Act . . . has become the centerpiece of the act”); id. at 629 (statement of Armand Derfner) (testifying that “section 5 is
in a sense a fulcrum of the act”); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT:
TEN YEARS AFTER, in Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148,
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posed change in “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure” to the Department of Justice or
U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia for a determination
that the change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color.”36 In other words, section 5 embodied the lack of trust that
made the Act a necessity. The solution itself was nothing short of
radical and unorthodox.
For jurisdictions subject to section 5, traditional burdens and presumptions were turned on their head; in essence, their laws were
considered unconstitutional unless and until the jurisdictions proved
otherwise. And the burden of proof on this important point was on
the jurisdictions themselves, not the government. This was crucial,
because the jurisdictions must ultimately prove a negative—that
their changes neither had the purpose nor would they have the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.
Until they made this showing—that is, until they precleared their
changes as demanded under section 5 of the Act—these select jurisdictions as covered under section 4 of the Act could not implement
their voting changes.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CONGRESSIONAL POWERS,
AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
From the time the Johnson administration introduced the voting
rights bill in Congress, two questions took center stage. The first was
the question of whether Congress had the power under section 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment to enact the Voting Rights Act. This question focused with particular care on the coverage formula and the
preclearance requirement, as these aspects of the Act targeted specific jurisdictions in the South and, as such, evoked memories of Reconstruction. The second was the necessary question of statutory construction. For example, what qualifies as a “voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure”37 under
section 5 of the Act? Also, how should one determine when a change
does not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color? And further, is the purpose prong
in any way related to the effect prong? Taken together, these questions would determine the effectiveness of the Act into the future,
and as such they thrust the Supreme Court to the center of the debate. The Court’s handling of these questions, the topic of the next
H.R. 3247 and H.R. 3501 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 969, 988 (1975).
36. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965).
35. Id.
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two Parts, raises one of the most interesting and important paradoxes in modern constitutional law. But first, the next Section takes a
look at the debate from the eyes of the critics of the bill in Congress.
A. The Act in Congress: Three Questions
The constitutional debate over the Voting Rights Act began as
soon as the bill reached the appropriate House and Senate committees. And in these fora, the debate carried on as expected; critics of
the Act marshaled all arguments, large and small, against the legislation. This was a real debate, and it highlighted the momentousness
of this occasion and the degree to which the bill pushed awfully hard
at myriad constitutional norms. The Constitution was in the minds of
all the participants, many of whom often cited past Supreme Court
opinions in support of their positions.38 This is where critics of the
legislation waged their strongest battle, over the constitutionality of
the bill. The Senate hearings provided particularly fertile ground for
these arguments, under the leadership of Senator Eastman of Mississippi and Senator Ervin of North Carolina.
Critics of the Act in Congress argued that the proposed legislation
would “destroy” the Constitution39 and would require “throwing the
Constitution of your country out the window.”40 “Nobody,” according
to Judge Perez, representing the Governor of Louisiana, “is
dumb enough not to understand that.”41 These arguments took various forms.
38. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 112 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (“Congressman, an awful lot of our constitutional
arguments were made, as I am sure you recall, with respect to the 1964 act. I think they
were sincerely made and we were able to persuade nine justices of the Supreme Court as to
our position and the constitutionality of that bill.”); see also id. at 385 (statement of Joseph
Rauh, counsel for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) (“I do not even consider this
a close question because I think the people who are talking about it do not reckon with the
fact that the Supreme Court has never in recent history questioned Congress [sic] judgment in this area.”). Some critics of the legislation grudgingly conceded this point. See id.
at 626 (statement of Rep. John Dowdy) (“Possibly in these days it is vain to advance constitutional questions, in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has assumed the power to
amend the Constitution by judicial decree, and the Executive is here demanding that Congress amend it by legislative act, wholly ignoring the plain provisions of that Constitution . . . .”).
39. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 77 (statement of Sen. Ervin).
40. Id. at 155 (statement of Sen. James O. Eastland, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); see id. at 57-63 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (making a constitutional argument
against the bill while disagreeing with a recent Supreme Court case); id. at 548 (statement
of Judge L.H. Perez, representing Gov. John J. McKeithen of La.) (“You are violating the
Constitution and your sworn duty to uphold the Constitution, and the provisions are too
plain and too clear. Nobody is dumb enough not to understand that.”); id. at 615 (statement of Paul Rodgers, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen. of Ga.) (arguing that the bill is unconstitutional). To be fair, supporters of the legislation also worried abut the constitutionality of
the bill. See, e.g., id. at 140 (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart) (asking the Attorney General
about the constitutionality of the bill and the Solicitor General’s views).
41. Id. at 548.
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1. A Question of Congressional Powers
A leading criticism attacked the classifications under the Act as
an unreasonable exercise of congressional power under the Fifteenth
Amendment.42 This was a criticism of the coverage formula and the
drafters’ decision to draw its line of inclusion at fifty percent voting
turnout or registration rates and the existence of a literacy test. Time
and again, critics complained that the coverage formula was “a cockeyed formula,”43 “arbitrary,”44 and lacking in “logic,”45 “rhyme and
reason.”46 The criticism had two components. First, some critics complained that the formula was overinclusive, as it covered some jurisdictions that were free of racial discrimination in voting47 and could
only be understood as an effort to punish the Southern states.48 How
could Congress justify the inclusion of Louisiana and some North
Carolina counties under the Act, for example, when the state of Texas and some counties in New York, neither of which came within the
purview of the trigger formula, had lower voting turnout rates during
the 1964 presidential election?49
Second, and in the words of Representative Cramer: “What constitutional basis is there for that where the effect of it is obviously to
strike down the State’s constitutional rights to fix voter qualifica42. See id. at 139 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“I have a high respect for your opinion,
but that is about the most unreasonable classification ever made, in my judgment . . . .”);
id. at 50 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“I have difficulty understanding why the Department of
Justice would draw up such an unreasonable bill as this.”).
43. Id. at 199, 234, 272, 283 (statement of Sen. Ervin).
44. Id. at 265 (statement of Att’y Bloch); see id. at 281 (“The inference it seeks to draw
is purely arbitrary; there is no rational relation to the premise, even if it be a fact, and the
ultimate fact in issue . . . .”).
45. Id. at 647 (statement of James J. Kilpatrick, Vice Chairman, Va. Comm. on Constitutional Gov’t); see id. at 33 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“So I say, Mr. Attorney General,
that I do not think there is necessarily any logical connection between the assumption
based on these percentages and the presumption that there was a violation of the 14th
Amendment.”).
46. Id. at 234 (statement of Sen. Ervin).
47. Senator Ervin made this point innumerable times with respect to the counties in
North Carolina that would come under the coverage formula. See, e.g., id. at 769 (“I envy
people sometimes who worry about sins far away from home because it acts as an opiate
and blinds them to conditions existing on their own doorstep. It is a whole lot easier to try
to reform people far away from home than it is to reform your own constituents.”).
48. See id. at 564 (statement of Judge Perez) (labeling covered jurisdictions under the
formula “conquered provinces”); id. at 625 (statement of Sen. John J. Sparkman) (“It is a
harsh bill, designed to punish the South.”); id. at 292 (statement of Att’y Bloch) (comparing
the bill to a lynching of the states). Attorney General Katzenbach and Senator Dirksen responded that the formula was neutral on its face and applied to all fifty states. See, e.g., id.
at 171 (statement of Sen. Dirksen) (“And it applies to all of the 50 States of the Union,
where the right to vote is abridged or denied.”).
49. See id. at 241. Chairman Eastland asked why Texas would not come under the
coverage formula and whether that was done intentionally. See id. at 164 (“Was not one of
your big hassles to plan to keep Texas out of this bill? Is that not the reason that you have
this test or device in here, to keep Texas out?”). Senator Ervin brought up the comparison
with Texas as well. See id. at 722.
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tions in areas where no discrimination has been found to exist?”50
This point had a great deal of force. Recall that under the trigger
provision, a state or political subdivision would come under the purview of the Act if it made use of a literacy test and less than fifty percent of its voters were registered on November 1, 1964, or its voter
turnout dipped under fifty percent for the 1964 Presidential election.
Of necessity, this would mean that some jurisdictions that were free
of discrimination would come under the provisions of the bill; that is,
some jurisdictions would be deprived of their constitutional right to
set voter qualifications.51 And yet, if the Fifteenth Amendment proscribes racial discrimination in voting, and Congress is seeking to enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation, how could Congress
designate as covered jurisdictions areas with no proven instances of
such discrimination?
As a general matter, Attorney General Katzenbach offered that
the proposed bill was a constitutional means of enforcing the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. In response to the critique of the
proposed coverage formula, he contended that the bill set up working
categories under which it classified the states in accordance to the
formula, and “[g]iven a valid factual premise—as we have it here—it
is for Congress to set the boundaries. That is essentially a legislative
function which the courts do not and cannot quibble about.”52 This
was a basic question of constitutional authority, which he argued the
Fifteenth Amendment conferred upon Congress.
The Attorney General conceded that the states had a constitutional right to set their own voting qualifications as they saw fit. This
was Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections,53 a case that
critics of the legislation cited incessantly54 and which explained that
“[t]he States have long been held to have broad powers to determine
the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised absent of course the discrimination which the Constitution con-

50. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 88.
51. See id. at 112 (statement of Rep. Ashmore) (“I am convinced that there is a serious
question of States’ rights . . . .”); id. at 601 (statement of Daniel McLeod, Att’y Gen. of S.C.)
(“[Y]ou are infringing upon and usurping the State rights when you impose Federal determination of voting qualifications under the 15th amendment.”); id. at 755 (statement of
Rep. Basil L. Whitener) (contending that the legislation is beyond constitutional authority,
as the states have the right to set voter qualifications); 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note
5, at 309 (statement of Att’y Bloch) (branding the Act a “conspiracy to destroy our State
laws for voter qualifications”); id. at 705 (statement of Robert Y. Button, Att’y Gen. of Va.)
(complaining that the bill is a sham and “merely one step in a scheme for ultimate Federal
control of the conduct of all State and local elections”).
52. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 14.
53. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
54. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 113 (statement of Rep. Ashmore);
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 208 (statement of Sen. Ervin).
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demns.”55 But Lassiter did not stop there, since, “[o]f course, a literacy test, fair on its face, may be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot.”56
And so the Attorney General concluded:
The constitutional rule is clear: So long as State laws or practices
erecting voting qualifications for non-Federal elections do not run
afoul of the 14th or 15th amendments, they stand undisturbed.
But when State power is abused—as it plainly is in the areas affected by the present bill—there is no magic in the words “voting
qualification.”57

The right of states to set their voting qualifications was not absolute; it went only as far as the commands of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments began. A state may not violate these commands
under the guise of erecting “voting qualification[s].”
This argument failed to respond to Congressman Cramer’s powerful constitutional objection to the inclusion of nondiscriminatory jurisdictions within the coverage of the Act. But the Attorney General
felt quite confident on this score as well. As he explained, those areas
free of discrimination within a larger discriminatory jurisdiction are
exceptions and “cannot be used as a proper support for saying . . . you
can’t regulate other units within the State or the State as a whole.”58
After all, he argued elsewhere, “the fact that you are not cutting with
absolute surgical skill and may pick up some other area is not of vital
importance and is constitutionally irrelevant.”59 On this point, he felt
so confident about the administration’s course of action and the constitutionality of the bill that he did not “even see the constitutional
difficulty.”60 So long as Congress acted reasonably, the legislation
would bear scrutiny. And to his mind, “all [the bill] is doing is taking
reasonable and appropriate steps to enforce the 15th Amendment.”61
2. A Question of Constitutional Proscriptions
A second criticism contended that the legislation was both a bill of
attainder and an ex post facto law, in violation of Article I, section
9.62 According to Senator Ervin, an ex post facto law is a law that
“imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the
time of commitment or imposes additional punishment to that prescribed or changes the rule of evidence by which less or different tes55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
Id. at 53.
1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 88.
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 89.
See id. at 62-63.
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timony is sufficient to convict than was then required.”63 Under this
definition, the proposed bill was an ex post facto law, since “a State
or political subdivision was not subjected to the punishment of being
deprived of their power to prescribe and administer literacy tests by
the fact that less than 50 percent of their people of voting age failed
to vote in the presidential election of 1964.”64 Senator Ervin similarly
argued that the proposed legislation was
a bill of attainder as it deprives the States, certain States and certain counties of certain States which are defined in terms by the
act itself, and election officials in those States, and counties, of certain powers vested in the States and political subdivisions of the
States. It does this without a judicial trial, and furthermore, it
does this on the basis of a fact completed in the past.65

Attorney General Katzenbach disagreed with both criticisms. On
the first, he argued that “where the Congress is given an express
power to implement a provision of the Constitution it may adopt any
reasonable and appropriate means for doing it.”66 Attorney General
Katzenbach also disagreed that this was either a bill of attainder or
an ex post facto law, as the bill “is not a punishment.”67
3. A Question of States’ Rights
Finally, the critics took the banner of states’ rights and complained that “[y]ou would just as well wipe out your State lines if this
theory of legislation is held constitutional.”68 In other words, if
Congress could enact such drastic measures into law, what couldn’t
Congress do? Or as Senator Stennis complained, passage of the Act
“sets a precedent for anything that anybody might want, a majority
of the Congress or any President might want at any given time on
any subject.”69
These were serious arguments against the constitutionality of the
bill, raising difficult questions under existing law. At the end of three
days of heavy questioning at the hands of Senator Ervin, Attorney
General Katzenbach told the committee that he “ha[d] confidence in
the constitutionality of the bill.”70 Once the President signed the bill
into law on August 6th, the national focus shifted to the Supreme
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 64-65.
66. Id. at 88; see also id. at 674 (statement of Thomas Watkins, representing the Gov.
of Miss.).
67. Id. at 63.
68. Id. at 293 (statement of Att’y Bloch); see id. at 309 (statement of Judge Perez)
(branding the Act a “conspiracy to destroy our State laws for voter qualification”).
69. Id. at 831.
70. Id. at 249.
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Court and its imminent handling of these complex constitutional issues. The next Section shifts its focus to the Court as well.
B. The Act in Court
The Supreme Court heard arguments on the constitutionality of
the statute a scant five months after its passage, and it issued an
opinion seven weeks later.71 This was the last stand of critics of the
bill, and they felt confident about their position. To some, “the bill
[was] based on emotionalism and is shot through with weaknesses
which . . . the Supreme Court could [not] possibly uphold”;72 and others, while professing a “strong enough faith in the intellectual honesty of the members of that Court, . . . do not believe they would for 1
minute permit this unconstitutional act to be upheld.”73 But some
critics were not quite as optimistic. According to James Kilpatrick,
then vice chairman of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional
Government: “it is . . . unfortunate that members of the Supreme
Court of the United States appeared—turned up to here [sic] the
President’s message and appeared on the television cameras applauding. I think this is a violation of the separation of powers of the
United States and creates imbalances.”74
This Section examines the history of the Voting Rights Act in
court. This is a story replete with familiar themes. In fact, the most
intriguing aspect of the Court’s handling of the Voting Rights Act is
how the Justices continue to deploy the same arguments either in defense of or against the constitutionality of the Act. For the Court, this
is a debate about judicial findings and the pursuit of legitimate state
interests; in contrast, the dissenting Justices often decry the Court’s
abdication of its long-established responsibility as constitutional interpreter. As we look to the future of the Act and the looming challenge to its constitutionality, the only question left is whether the
Court will stick to its old script.
1. Findings, Rationality, and the Court as Partner: The
Katzenbach Cases
Think for a moment about the challenge facing the Justices as
they debated the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. If the debate in Congress was any indication, this would not be an easy case.
Congress and the administration pushed as hard as they could
against established constitutional norms, and it was now up to the
Court to determine whether they had pushed too hard. Were the
71.
72.
73.
74.

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 301 (1966).
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 629 (statement of Sen. Sparkman).
Id. at 678 (statement of Thomas Watkins, representing the Gov. of Miss.).
Id. at 642.
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Court inclined to strike down the Act as outside the powers of Congress, it had many arguments with which to do so. But the question
for the Court was not whether the Act was beyond the powers of
Congress; rather, the question was whether the Justices had the will
to side against overwhelming congressional majorities and the national mood. This is not something that the Court does very often.75
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,76 the Court acknowledged that
the Act established “stringent new remedies”77 and that some of its
provisions were “inventive”78 and “uncommon.”79 To suggest otherwise would be foolish. Yet the Court recognized that “exceptional
conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”80 And further, Congress was not acting rashly and hastily, but
rather it “explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in voting.”81
Thus, on the record before it, the Court concluded that the means
used by Congress were a legitimate, permissible response to the problem at hand.82 “After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment,” the Court explained in a moment of great candor, “Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”83 Deference to Congress was the order of the day.
A cursory reading of the Court’s opinion discloses an obvious affinity with the government’s position during the congressional hearings, a fact that the Court did not attempt to hide. The arguments
75. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J. 563 (2001); see
also THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989); ROBERT G.
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 230 (3rd ed. 2000); Richard Funston, The
Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 807 (1975).
76. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
77. Id. at 308.
78. Id. at 327.
79. Id. at 334.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 308. The critics disagreed with this point, to be sure, and vehemently so. See
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 54 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“Congress has rarely
been called upon to enact a law which bears on its face the marks of having been written in
such haste as this one.”); id. at 616 (statement of Paul Rodgers, Jr., Assistant Att’y General of State of Ga.) (“The bill was rather hazily drawn and I think it is obvious . . . .”); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 623 (statement of former Rep. Watson) (“All of
us know, Mr. Chairman, that the support of this measure is primarily the result of mass
hysteria created and nurtured by the national press.”). While Senator Ervin repeated this
complaint often, see 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 54, 235, 593, the Attorney General denied it. See id. at 54 (“It wasn’t written in all that haste. There were a lot of revisions that were made, as I think is true of almost every law that is enacted, that there are
changes made in committee, changes made up to the last minute. Just because changes are
made, just before the bill is reported, you don’t say that the bill was drafted in haste.”).
82. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 334.
83. Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
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were familiar ones. The coverage formula, and particularly its reliance on test and devices and turnout and registration rates, was rational on its face and as applied to the covered states. The use of test
and devices needed little explanation, since these tests had a long
and settled historical pedigree “as a tool for perpetrating the evil.”84
The use of voter turnout rates was similarly “obvious” and legitimate,
as widespread efforts to disenfranchise voters “must inevitably” lead
to low voting rates.85 The Court also was unimpressed by the fact
that the formula did not include some jurisdictions for which evidence of voting discrimination exists. Congress need not handle all
aspects of a problem in the same way, the Court explained, “so long
as the distinctions drawn have some basis in practical experience.”86
More tellingly for the Court, the record put together by Congress did
not reveal any state or political subdivision exempted by the coverage
formula yet guilty of racial discrimination through the use of tests
and devices. While the critics complained that this confirmed the discriminatory nature of the formula as applied against the Southern
states, the Court concluded that “[t]his fact confirms the rationality
of the formula.”87
The Court disposed of any and all arguments similarly. For example, to the argument that the bailout provision was a nullity and
imposed an impossible burden on the covered states, the Court offered the testimony of the Attorney General that the burden would be
no more than the submission of affidavits from voting officials.88 Similarly, the five-year suspension of literacy tests “was a legitimate
response to the problem” evidenced by the record and “for which
there is ample precedent in Fifteenth Amendment cases.”89 As to the
criticism that the role assigned to the District Court in D.C. under
section 5 would amount to the authorization of advisory opinions in
violation of Article III, it is not so. This is because a covered state
wishing to amend its voting laws had a “controversy” with the federal
government, and a court’s determination that the voting change in
question complied with the Act was an appropriate judicial remedy.90
The ease with which the Court set aside the constitutional challenges posed by the Voting Rights Act should not be surprising. Congress was finally confronting a national disgrace, and the Court
would not stand in the way of a solution. To the Court, the Act was

84. Id. at 330.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 331 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); Ry.
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 332.
89. Id. at 334.
90. See id. at 335.
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well within past exercises of congressional powers. But the real story
of the case is how willing the Justices were in giving Congress muchneeded room to handle this problem. The Court did not only defer to
Congress; to some, it abdicated. And, this would not be the last time.
If any doubt remained about the Court’s posture of deference, a
more difficult constitutional challenge lay in the wings. Section 4(e)
of the Act provided that no person who has completed a sixth grade
education in a school accredited by the commonwealth of Puerto Rico
shall be denied the right to vote on account of an inability to read or
write English.91 This provision ran into direct conflict with the recent
precedent established by Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of
Elections,92 a case decided a scant six years earlier, where the Court
turned down a facial challenge to literacy tests. If Lassiter stood for
the proposition that literacy tests were legitimate exercises of state
authority absent the intent to discriminate on racial grounds, could
Congress strike down a state literacy test devoid of any indicia of racial intent?
The Court answered this question in Katzenbach v. Morgan.93 In
an opinion authored by Justice Brennan, the Court explained that
the question was not whether application of the literacy requirement
violated the equal protection clause. Rather, the question in Morgan
was whether section 4(e) was “ ‘appropriate legislation’ to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause.”94 The Court unsurprisingly concluded that
it was, while asserting in a controversial footnote that “Congress’
power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict,
abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”95
As in South Carolina, the story in Morgan was one of clear and
unbridled deference to the wishes of Congress. To even call it lowlevel review would be misleading, for that implies that there was any
review at all. There was not. Congress made all the needed weighing
and balancing, answered all the questions, and reached all the
needed conclusions. This was enough for the Court. The Justices
were not interested in reviewing how Congress resolved these various
questions; all it needed was to “perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.”96
The Morgan case must be understood for what it was: a moment
in time when the Court ceded some of its traditional power to define
the substantive scope of the Constitution to Congress and its own
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e)(2), 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965).
360 U.S. 45 (1959).
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
Id. at 651.
Id. at 651 n.10.
Id. at 653.
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power to enforce the Constitution. Under existing doctrine, that is,
the state literacy test was neither irrational nor arbitrary, and thus
constitutional; yet Congress declared it unconstitutional all the same,
and by a mere “ipse dixit,” no less.97 The Court did not even demand a
factual record to support the congressional conclusion. This was a
question, Justice Harlan complained in dissent, “for the judicial
branch ultimately to determine.”98 But the Court was not persuaded
and happily ceded ground to Congress to carry on its important work.
Or, as former Solicitor General Cox testified during the 1969 Senate
hearings, Morgan was “a token of congressional supremacy.”99
2. Too Much of a Good Thing: Literacy Tests and Oregon v.
Mitchell
This forgiving and deferential posture of the Court to the Act continued through the years. In Oregon v. Mitchell, for example, the
Court unanimously upheld a five-year nationwide ban on literacy
tests.100 On its face, this ban posed a difficult question of constitutional law, maybe even an insurmountable one. It was one thing to
ban literacy tests within jurisdictions guilty of racial discrimination,
as supported by extensive congressional findings. (This was South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.) It would be another to ban these literacy
tests across all fifty states, in the absence of similar findings for all
affected jurisdictions.
Yet the Court hardly flinched. Four Justices—Black, Stewart,
Burger, and Blackmun—saw the problem of literacy and voting as a
national problem and welcomed the nationwide extension as recognition of this fact.101 Congressional findings fully supported this conclusion. As Justice Black explained, Congress had evidence that literacy
tests had long been used to discriminate and disenfranchise voters.102
Congress also had evidence of the history of discriminatory educational opportunities across the nation.103 Justice Stewart similarly
concluded that Congress had enough evidence from the 1965 hearings to reach this conclusion.104
The remaining Justices took a similarly deferential posture. For
Justice Douglas, the Court in Morgan “traveled most of the distance

97. Id. at 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 667.
99. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 334.
100. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 133 (1970).
101. See id.; see also id. at 284 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
102. Id. at 132 (majority opinion).
103. Id. at 133.
104. Id. at 284 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2009]

PARADOXICAL CASE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

717

needed to sustain this Act,”105 and in light of the legislative history,
“we certainly cannot say that the means used were inappropriate.”106
Justice Harlan conceded that he might have preferred a less aggressive approach in this “delicate area,” yet “the choice which Congress
made was within the range of the reasonable.”107 And Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, concluded that “there is
no question but that Congress could legitimately have concluded that
the use of literacy tests anywhere within the United States has the
inevitable effect of denying the vote” to persons of color unable to
pass these tests as a direct result of discriminatory educational systems.108 Notably, Justice Brennan added that the legislative record
“amply supported” this conclusion.109
Once again, a hard question was made easy by a Court that was
only too willing to step out of the way. And so, after Oregon, only one
question remained: did the power of Congress under the Fifteenth
Amendment know any limits?
3. The End of the Road? City of Rome
Ten years later, in City of Rome v. United States,110 Congress appeared to meet its match. This was the sternest challenge to the constitutionality of the Act since the Katzenbach cases. But the Court
followed its now familiar script and upheld the constitutionality of
the Act.111 Two questions in particular deserved close attention.
First, if the onerous nature of the special provisions of the Act
were partly justified as a temporary remedy to the problem, how to
defend yet another extension of the Act, this time from 1975 to 1982?
To the Court, this was not a difficult question. The Act had accomplished much in terms of both black registration and the election of
black officials, yet Congress had concluded that such progress was
“modest and spotty.”112 As in previous years, Congress considered the
existing need for the preclearance requirement in light of such
progress.113 The record reflected the requisite findings. And so the
Court concluded: “When viewed [in historical context,] Congress’ considered determination that at least another 7 years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of
105. Id. at 145 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 147.
107. Id. at 217 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id. at 235 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by White, J., and Marshall, J.).
109. Id. at 236.
110. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
111. Id. at 187.
112. Id. at 181 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 7-11 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 1119 (1975)).
113. See id. (“Congress gave careful consideration to the propriety of readopting § 5’s
preclearance requirement.”).
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pervasive voting discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable.”114
The second question posed a more difficult challenge. At the time
of South Carolina, the Court had yet to settle on the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment; or, more specifically, it had yet to determine
whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibited both purposeful racial discrimination as well as state action that was discriminatory in
effect. For this reason, the Court need not spend an inordinate
amount of time in South Carolina discussing the intent/effect language of the Act (i.e., the Act’s prohibition on qualifications, standards, practices, or procedures that have the purpose and will have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color) and whether such a standard remained within the scope of
the Amendments. In Washington v. Davis,115 however, the Court determined that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause demanded
purposeful discrimination. By extension, in City of Mobile v. Bolden116—decided the same day as City of Rome—the Court incorporated a similar standard into the Fifteenth Amendment. These two
cases demanded a reconsideration of the Court’s prior acquiescence
to the statutory standard. Could Congress prohibit, under the preclearance requirement, state voting practices devoid of purposeful discrimination but only with a discriminatory effect?
Continuing with its prior deferential posture, a six-member majority answered this question affirmatively.117 The holding rested on familiar cases—South Carolina, Morgan, and Oregon—which the
Court read in helpful and forgiving ways. Curiously, the Court did
not discuss the impact of Washington v. Davis to this area of the law.
Instead, it explained that “Congress could rationally have concluded
that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of
purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that
have a discriminatory impact.”118 In other words, the incidence of
coverage under section 4(b) of the Act—the very section at the heart
of the constitutional challenge in 1965—was offered as the reason for
subjecting these covered jurisdictions to a more expansive standard
than demanded by the Fifteenth Amendment. As hard as it tried, the
Court explained in a telling passage that it could “find no reason . . .
to disturb Congress’ considered judgment.”119

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 182.
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 157.
Id. at 177 (citation omitted).
Id. at 178.
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I neither criticize nor praise the Court’s posture in City of Rome.
Of greater interest is the fact that the Court granted Congress what
amounted to a free pass under the Reconstruction Amendments to
solve the nation’s racial ills as Congress saw fit. Or, as Justice Rehnquist remarked in his forceful dissent, offering both Marbury v. Madison120 and United States v. Nixon121 for support and echoing Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Morgan: “While the presumption of constitutionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of the Federal Government or of one of the States, it is this Court which is ultimately
responsible for deciding challenges to the exercise of power by those
entities.”122 He concluded that the Court’s decision in that case, City
of Rome, was “nothing less than a total abdication of that authority.”123
4. The Act Meets the New Federalism: Monterey County
This forgiving posture toward the constitutional status of the Act
has not been affected by the recent federalism revolution. This is a
key piece of evidence, for I can scarcely think of any other congressional enactment as intrusive as the Voting Rights Act into matters
of state concern.124 To be sure, the Court and Congress have acknowledged the federalism concerns raised by the Act. But the argument
has yet to carry the day. In South Carolina, for example, the Court
explained that matters within the power of the states are not insulated from federal judicial review when used to “circumvent[] a federally protected right,”125 a conclusion it reiterated fifteen years later
in City of Rome.126

120. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
121. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
122. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 207 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 293-94 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Section 5 is a unique requirement that exacts significant federalism costs, as we
have recognized on more than one occasion. . . . The section’s interference with state sovereignty is quite drastic. . . .” (citations omitted)); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526,
543 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (“Although the constitutionality of § 5 has long since
been upheld, it remains a serious matter that a sovereign State must submit its legislation
to federal authorities before it may take effect.” (citation omitted)); Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 585 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“For the Court has now construed § 5 to require a revolutionary innovation in American
government that goes far beyond that which was accomplished by § 4.”); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Section 5, by providing that some of the States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities to approve
their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless.”).
125. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 325.
126. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 178-80.
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Crucially, this argument has survived the recent case of City of
Boerne v. Flores127 and its substantial progeny.128 According to leading voices within the law of democracy,129 these cases place the Act in
grave constitutional danger, as neither a congruent nor proportional
remedy to the asserted constitutional harm. Commentators focus on
the issue of findings and counsel Congress to develop a detailed and
thorough record in support of the statute. But this is largely a distraction.130 We have seen this issue before, in South Carolina, Oregon, and City of Rome. We also saw it in Justice Harlan’s dissent in
Morgan. And in case any doubt remained, the Court has been explicit
about its posture toward the Act in Lopez v. Monterey County,131 a
case decided post-Boerne.
In Monterey County, the Court faced yet another difficult question
raised by the Act: is a state law enacted by a noncovered state subject to preclearance when a covered county “seek[s] to administer”
such law? In other words, must Monterey County seek preclearance
of a law passed by the State of California, a noncovered jurisdiction,
even though the county exercised no independent discretion in enacting the law? For an answer, the Court referred to the language of the
statute, which read as follows: “[Federal preclearance is required]
[w]henever a [covered] State or political subdivision . . . shall enact or
seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different
from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964.”132 The question in
Monterey County focused on the meaning of the phrase “seek to administer.” The Court concluded that this language signaled Congress’s clear intention that all changes be precleared irrespective of
any discretion exercised by the covered jurisdiction in enacting the
law. As applied to the County of Monterey, this meant that the county must submit for preclearance a law from the State of California
that the county played no role in enacting.
The implications of this position were not lost on the Court. To require Monterey County to preclear changes enacted by the State of
California would turn California into a pseudo-covered state for purposes of section 5. Yet California did not have the history of discrimi127. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
128. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
129. See supra note 10.
130. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 6.
131. 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
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nation that would warrant statutory coverage under the Act. As a
consequence, this reading of the statutory language might “tread on
rights constitutionally reserved to the States.”133 This is a considerable argument. Surely Congress could not subject innocent states to
the drastic measures of section 5 due to the sins of local subdivisions
within its jurisdiction. Could such an exertion of congressional power
possibly survive the recent Boerne revolution?
In a word, yes. The Court’s response reads like a “who’s who” of
voting rights law. Many big cases made an appearance, such as
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,134 City of Rome v. United States,135
Gaston County v. United States,136 City of Boerne v. Flores,137 Miller v.
Johnson,138 and United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc.
v. Carey.139 This cast of characters told you everything you needed to
know. There were two related issues. The first issue was also an obvious one, and this is exactly where the Court began: yes, the Act imposes “substantial ‘federalism costs,’ ”140 yet the Reconstruction
Amendments by their very nature intrude on matters
“traditionally reserved to the States.”141 In this sense Monterey County did not present a new question; this was a remake of South Carolina and City of Rome, precedents that the Court was not inclined to
reconsider.142
The second issue struck at the heart of Boerne and its progeny:
could section 5 reach the actions of noncovered states? That is, could
Congress interfere with matters traditionally left to the states even
when the requisite evidence of racial discrimination does not exist?
The Court did not give this question its due, and that fact alone betrays the Court’s posture toward the constitutionality of the Act. This
was an old story, and the Court was sticking to its old script.
The Court began, as it must, with South Carolina and its holding
that Congress may seek to protect against both discriminatory animus and neutral state action that leads to harmful effects.143 Congress could even choose to protect discriminatory practices with only
a discriminatory effect; this was City of Rome. This was precisely
how the Court understood the challenge in Monterey County, so there
was nothing new to say. Congress could designate jurisdictions for
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Monterey County, 525 U.S. at 282.
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
446 U.S. 156 (1980).
395 U.S. 285 (1969).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
430 U.S. 144 (1977).
Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) (citing Miller, 515 U.S. at 926).
Id. at 282-83 (quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980)).
See id. at 283.
Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966)).
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coverage under the Act, and Congress could also reach state actions
that are only discriminatory in nature. As a consequence, the Court
concluded that Congress could require preclearance of state laws before they took effect on a covered county. The Court’s word choice
was quite revealing: “[s]ection 5, as we interpret it today, burdens
state law only to the extent that that law affects voting in jurisdictions properly designated for coverage.”144 And, in case any doubt remained, the Court offered what it took to be its trump card: until the
1970 Amendments extended the ban on literacy tests nationwide, the
Act suspended literacy tests within covered counties even though
these tests had been enacted by noncovered states. This was Gaston
County.145 Again, there was nothing new.
Monterey County was a difficult case, or at least it should have
been. The ease with which the Court situated these challenging facts
within the Act’s revered holdings betrays the Court’s posture toward
the statute in general. In this vein, the Court’s conclusion was nothing short of fanciful: “In short, the Voting Rights Act, by its nature,
intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment permits
this intrusion, however, and our holding today adds nothing of constitutional moment to the burdens that the Act imposes.”146 Whether
one agreed or disagreed with the Court’s conclusion, one must agree
that the Court did not give the constitutional question at the heart of
this case its due.147 It is hard not to read Monterey County as an instance of a court trying too hard to reach a desired conclusion.
Notably, Monterey County is not an outlying case in a world where
the Court keeps Congress in close check as it exercises its powers
under the Reconstruction Amendments. The opposite is true. From
the time the Court first upheld the constitutionality of the Act in the
Katzenbach cases, its posture has been deferential and forgiving. The
contemporary debate over the constitutionality of the recently
amended Act does not account for this history, and it instead presumes an aggressive Court. But make no mistake, once this
debate returns to the Court, the real question will not be one of
legislative findings and whether the Act is remedial in nature. The
only question will be whether the Court chooses to follow its traditional script.
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AS DYNAMIC POLICY-MAKING
Once the Court issued its definitive rulings on the constitutionality of the Act in the Katzenbach cases, the debate shifted in notable
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 284.
Id. (citing Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 287 (1969)).
Id. at 284-85.
See id. at 293-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ways. To be sure, some critics refused to accept the Court’s arguments. Prominent among these critics was Senator Sam Ervin, who
by 1969 had assumed the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee. During the 1969 hearings over amendments and extensions to the Act, for example, he
remarked: “the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional in every respect
notwithstanding what the Supreme Court said.”148 But this was a lost
battle and a waste of energy, as the debate shifted to the substantive
provisions of the Act. And on this score, the Court clearly led the way.
This Part examines the Court’s handling of the language of the
Act. And the lesson is unmistakable: from the time of the Court’s initial intervention in this area, the language of the statute and the intent of Congress have been no match for the Justices’ boundless imaginations. Section IV.A discusses the early cases, when the Court
expanded the reach of the statute in ways that surprised even Congress. Section IV.B offers Beer v. United States,149 a case that signaled an end to the Court’s expansive readings of the statutory language. Section IV.C moves ahead a generation, to the Bossier Parish
cases.150 As in Beer, these cases exemplify the Justices’ idiosyncratic
and debatable readings of the Act under the guise of effectuating the
intent of Congress. Section IV.D closes with Georgia v. Ashcroft,151 an
opinion that figured prominently in the 2006 debates in Congress.
The Georgia and Bossier Parish cases are important as one of the few
moments in the history of the Act when Congress corrected a judicial
interpretation of the statute. For my purposes, these cases are notable not for what they say as much as for what they led to: in light of
the Court’s penchant for interpretive creativity throughout the life of
the Act, what explains the congressional reactions to these cases?
A. The Early Cases
The Court’s early handling of the Act’s language follows a predictable pattern. From the moment the Court first engaged these materials in Allen v. State Board of Elections,152 its readings have been
creative and generous constructions of the language of the statute
and the intent of Congress. The Court led the way and molded the
broad and forgiving statutory language to its liking, and Congress

148. 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 175 (statement of Sen. Ervin); see id. at
357 (“I don’t consider that Katzenbach v. Morgan is constitutional. . . . I also don’t think
South Carolina v. Katzenbach is constitutional. . . .”).
149. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
150. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I), 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
151. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
152. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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willingly acquiesced. This conclusion holds true even at times when
the language of the statute appeared to offer a contrary outcome.
In order to make sense of the Court’s early interpretations of the
statute, one must first make sense of the goals that Congress and the
administration were pursuing with the Act. For evidence of these
goals, I turn to the House subcommittee hearings.
The hearings began on March 18, 1965, a scant three days after
President Johnson delivered his voting rights address to a joint session of Congress. From the time Chairman Celler called the meeting
to order, the goal of the new legislation became clear. As the chairman explained during his opening statement: “The time is here for
action. This committee will consider a strong bill that will guarantee
to Negroes the inalienable right to vote, and to safeguard that vote as
guaranteed by the Constitution.”153 The bill was a direct response to
the assortment of vote denial practices then in effect—“[t]he legalisms, stratagems, trickery, and coercion”154—that kept a majority of
voters of color from exercising their right to vote. Or, in the words of
Congressman McCulloch: “[T]he untrammeled right of qualified citizens to vote is the very cornerstone of representative government.
That right has been denied to many people in this country under color of law, and otherwise, too long. The time has come when such
denial must cease . . . .”155
The goal of the Act, in other words, was to remove discriminatory
tests and devices that denied otherwise qualified blacks of their right
to vote. Time and again, Attorney General Katzenbach made precisely this point in the context of defending the aggressive nature of the
new bill. Early on during his testimony, for example, he stated that
the bill sought to “translate [the government’s good] intentions into
ballots.”156 Moments later, he explained the bill as follows:
It is designed to deal with the two principal means of frustrating
the 15th amendment: the use of onerous, vague, unfair tests and
devices enacted for the purpose of disenfranchising Negroes, and
the discriminatory administration of these and other kinds of registration requirements. The bill accomplishes its objectives first, by
outlawing the use of these tests under certain circumstances, and
second, by providing for registration by Federal officials where necessary to ensure the fair administration of the registration system.157

The Attorney General repeated this point throughout his
testimony. “Our concern today,” he told the subcommittee, “is to en153. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 1 (statement of Chairman Emanuel Celler, Subcomm. No. 5 of H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id. at 9.
157. Id.
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large representative government, to solicit the consent of all the governed, to increase the number of citizens who can vote.”158 Moments
later, he explained that “the whole bill really is aimed at getting
people registered.”159
This position was met with some criticism from members of Congress who wished for the legislation to go further. For example, Congressman Corman asked whether the bill could attempt to deal with
other important questions, such as the issue of qualifications for
running for public office.160 After all, what would be the point of allowing blacks to register and vote if they could not run for office or,
at the very least, vote for their candidates of choice? In an oft-cited
passage, Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall responded:
“The problem that the bill was aimed at was the problem of registration, Congressman. If there is a problem of another sort, I would like
to see it corrected, but that is not what we were trying to deal with in
the bill.”161
There should be little question about the primary goals of the proposed bill. The political process across the South was a broken
process, and the bill aimed to fix it. In the face of mass disenfranchisement, the bill sought to (1) allow voters to register and (2) make
sure they were allowed to vote. Hence the suspension of literacy
tests, the need for poll watchers and federal registrars, and the preclearance requirement. The text of section 5 is particularly instructive
in uncovering the goals of the statute. Recall that under this section,
a covered jurisdiction may not seek to implement a voting change until preclearing it with the Department of Justice or the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. Yet before gaining preclearance for a voting change, “ ‘no person shall be denied the right to
vote for failure to comply with’ ”162 any such change. This must mean
that section 5 was intended to reach only those changes with which
prospective voters could comply.163 Until such changes were precleared, a prospective voter must be allowed to vote.
And then came, three years later, Allen v. State Board of Elections.164 Allen stood at a crucial moment in the Act’s history and
would decide its impact into the future. The case is important not only for the needed changes it brought to the preclearance process, but
also because it signaled the Court’s willingness to dialogue with Con158. Id. at 19.
159. Id. at 21.
160. Id. at 74.
161. Id.
162. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965).
163. Justice Harlan made precisely this claim in his dissent in Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 587 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis omitted).
164. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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gress in keeping the Act abreast of modern circumstances. Take first
the three procedural questions presented in the case: May a private
litigant bring a declaratory judgment action to determine whether a
voting change falls under section 5 of the Act? If so, must these private litigants bring their suits in the District of Columbia District
Court? And, did Congress intend for these suits to be heard before
three-judge courts? These questions ranged in difficulty, and the statute provided varying degrees of support.
The Court’s answers to these questions are not nearly as important as the evidentiary support offered by the Court. On the first
question, for example, the Court conceded that the statute was silent
on this issue, yet it ultimately concluded that private litigants may
bring these declaratory judgment suits.165 To decide otherwise would
mean that “[t]he achievement of the Act’s laudable goal could be severely hampered”166 and the promise of section 5 “might well prove
an empty promise.”167 In short, the promise of the Act could not be
left at the hands of the limited staff and resources of the Office of the
Attorney General.168 The government needed help in enforcing the
new law.
On the second question, the Court faced a more daunting challenge. According to section 14(b) of the Act, “[n]o court other than the
District Court for the District of Columbia . . . shall have jurisdiction
to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant to [§ 5] or any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of any provision of this Act . . . .”169 This language
strongly suggested that these private suits must be brought in “the
District Court for the District of Columbia.” But the Court had different ideas in mind. According to Allen, the language of section 14(b)
applied only to suits brought by the state under section 5, because
these were suits where the state sought an adjudication that the voting change did not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying the right to vote on account of race or color.170 When a private litigant brings suit, however, a court must only determine
whether the enactment in question falls under the purview of section
5. This distinction—or what the Court referred to as “the magnitude
of these two issues”171—meant that litigants may bring their private
suits in their local district courts.

165. Id. at 554-55.
166. Id. at 556.
167. Id. at 557.
168. See id. at 556.
169. Id. at 557-58 (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(b) (1964 & Supp.
I 1965)).
170. Id. at 558-60.
171. Id. at 559.
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The Court answered the third question similarly. Instead of a
close reading of the statutory language or a careful analysis of legislative materials, the Court offered the following: “in light of the extraordinary nature of the Act in general, and the unique approval requirement of § 5, Congress intended that disputes involving the coverage of § 5 be determined by a district court of three judges.”172
The substantive question at the heart of the Allen case occupied
much of the Court’s time, and for good measure. This was the main
attraction—the question that would determine the Act’s impact to
the future. As codified under section 5 of the Act, what was a “voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting”?173 One answer, pressed forcefully by
Justice Harlan in dissent, argued that this language referred only to
laws by which voters registered to vote and had their ballots
counted.174 If looking to the intent of the 89th Congress and the
Johnson administration, and as I argued previously, I think this is
the right answer. But the Court rejected this argument. Instead, the
Court explained, “[t]he Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as
well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.”175 This clear intention, coupled with the “weight of the legislative history,”176 led the
Court to conclude that Congress intended that “all changes, no matter how small, be subjected to § 5 scrutiny.”177 Examples include the
following: changes from districted to at-large elections;178 changes
from election to appointment of county officials;179 new procedures for
casting write-in ballots;180 and changes to the requirements for independent candidates who choose to run in general elections.181 The
reach of Allen was subsequently extended to reapportionment plans;182
annexations;183 and, inter alia, changing locations of polling places.184
This conclusion ran up against some difficult textual challenges.
In particular, how to square the Court’s expansive interpretation of
the scope of section 5 in the face of the statutory language directing
the preclearance requirement towards changes with which persons

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 563.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1964 & Supp. I 1965)).
See id. at 583 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 565.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 550-51.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 551.
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
Id.
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could “comply”?185 The Solicitor General admitted that this provision
was inconsistent with the Court’s interpretation of the Act, yet offered that it resulted from congressional oversight.186 The Court
simply ignored it.187
The Court’s creative handling of the language of the statute continued through the years. In Gaston County v. United States,188 the
Court offered a similarly expansive interpretation of section 4(a) of
the Act. Under this section, a covered jurisdiction wishing to reinstate its suspended test or device must show that “no such test or device has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the
action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color.”189 Gaston County wished to
make such a showing in federal court. But the district court denied it
relief, concluding that the county’s history of segregated and unequal
education would mean that the literacy test would have the effect of
discriminating against blacks. While underscoring its view that this
was not a per se rule, and in an opinion authored by Justice Harlan,
the Supreme Court agreed. Under section 4(a) of the Act, in other
words, a reviewing court may consider whether a literacy test would
have the effect of denying the right to vote as a consequence of the
jurisdiction’s history of segregated and inferior schools.190
In saying this, my point is not to suggest that the Court was
wrong to decide Allen and Gaston County as it did. Rather, my point
is only to underscore the obvious: the Allen decision, while necessary
from a real-world view, was neither preordained nor demanded by
the statutory materials. In fact, it may be said that Congress, in failing once again to anticipate the Southern response to the Act, did not
make the Court’s response any easier. But the Court was up to the task.

185. Allen, 393 U.S. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Id.
187. This conclusion led to further complications. Namely, would a town that does not
conduct voting registration be subject to section 5 preclearance? And is a board of education a political subdivision under the Act? The answer to both questions was clear to the
Johnson administration and the 89th Congress. Yet, in keeping with the logical extensions
of the Allen decision, the Court answered both questions affirmatively, first in United
States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U.S. 110, 117-35 (1977), and
the next year, in Dougherty County Board of Education v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 43-47 (1978).
188. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
189. Id. at 287 (citing Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat.
437, 438 (1965)).
190. Id. at 293.
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B. The Standards of Preclearance and the Search for
Congressional Intent: On the Birth of Retrogression
All too soon, however, the honeymoon came to an end. With City of
Richmond v. United States191 and Beer v. United States,192 the Court
began an apparent retreat from its earlier, expansive interpretations
of the Act. The Beer opinion is particularly instructive for how the
Court made use of the available congressional materials and reached
a conclusion that is, to put it charitably, debatable at best. This Section focuses its attention on Beer as yet another example of an aggressive Court doing what it wants with the open-ended and forgiving language of the Voting Rights Act.
The question at the heart of the Beer litigation appeared to be a
relatively simple one: in applying section 5 of the Act, under what
standard must the district court or the Attorney General assess
whether a districting plan has the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on racial grounds?193 Upon inspection, however, this
question proved to be anything but simple, perhaps unnecessarily so.
After all, as the district court recognized in an opinion authored by
Judge Spottswood Robinson, III, “[t]he legislative history of the Act
establishes the full and firm allegiance of its own objectives with the
goals of the [Fifteenth] Amendment.”194 In using “parallel language,”195 Congress signaled its intention to enforce the dictates of
the Fifteenth Amendment without resorting to the traditionally timeconsuming judicial process.
In other words, it stands to reason that Congress simply wished to
shift the constitutional inquiry both temporally and institutionally to
the Attorney General or the district court, before changes in the law
took place, while also shifting the burden of proof and placing it on
the states and political subdivisions. The standard under section 5
review would thus be the same standard under the Fifteenth
Amendment,196 with section 5 acting as a prophylactic. The fact that
Congress said little about the particular standard that would govern
section 5 inquiries is telling, particularly since section 5 had become
by 1975 the “centerpiece” of the Act.197 If the standard were anything

191. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
192. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
193. Id. at 130.
194. Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 382 (D.D.C. 1974).
195. Id.
196. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contending that “it is questionable whether the ‘purpose and effect’ language states anything
more than the constitutional standard”); id. at 146 (explaining that section 5 cases “make
clear” that the effects inquiry “is essentially the constitutional inquiry”).
197. 1975 House Hearings, supra note 35, at 40 (statement of Arthur Fleming, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).

730

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:697

other than what common sense would appear to dictate, surely Congress would have made its intentions far more explicit.
The district court in Beer understood its task under section 5
along these lines. To its credit, the district court conducted a nuanced
and fact-intensive inquiry, which highlighted the clear and longstanding role played by race in the political and cultural life of New
Orleans.198 The court then looked to the doctrinal structure provided
by the Supreme Court’s reapportionment cases and analogized its
“abridgment” inquiry under the Act to the Supreme Court’s vote dilution inquiry.199 In making this move, the court made clear that “the
question before us is not whether New Orleans must confer upon its
black citizens every political advantage that a redistricting plan conceivably could offer.”200 Rather, plaintiffs must “press vigorously . . .
for all that is their due, but . . . no more.”201 Or, as former Attorney
General Katzenbach argued during the 1975 Senate hearings,
“[w]hile blacks have made important gains, these gains do not reflect
the political power of their numbers were there no discrimination.”202
The inquiry was essentially an inquiry of unconstitutional vote dilution as commonly understood. Such an inquiry demands a comparison between an optimal state of affairs and the challenged circumstances. In this vein, the court explained that “the relevant comparison is between the results which the minority is constitutionally free
to command and the results which the plan leaves the minority able
to achieve.”203 Put another way, the comparison was between theoretical results free of any dilutive influence and the actual results under
the challenged districting plan. On the facts, the district court concluded that the districting plan would unjustifiably dilute the black
vote in New Orleans and that “[s]urely the Fifteenth Amendment . . .
discountenances the abridgment evident in this case.”204 Under the
factors of Zimmer v. McKeithen205 and recent vote dilution case law,206
the court further concluded that the plan would unjustifiably dilute
the potential black voting strength in the city.207 Finally, the court

198. See Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 374-75.
199. See id. at 383.
200. Id. at 389.
201. Id. at 390.
202. Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S.
1409, and S. 1443 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 125 (1975).
203. Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 388.
204. Id. at 393.
205. 485 F. 2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973).
206. See Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 384-85.
207. See id. at 393-99.
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concluded also that the city had not justified its use of two at-large
seats.208
In an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.209 Over a scant twelve-page opinion, the Court managed to turn what could be a difficult issue—if the lower court opinion is any indication—into a simplistic one. The question was the
same: when does a districting plan have “the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color”?210 The Court began its analysis by pointing out that this inquiry is not a constitutional inquiry; rather, it is a question of statutory interpretation.211
This meant, of course, that the Act’s legislative history and Congress’s intent were controlling. Then, after offering a smattering of
quotes and citations from past opinions and congressional reports,
the Court shifted its gaze to the 1975 House Report. In particular,
the Court focused on the following passage:
When it adopted a 7-year extension of the Voting Rights Act in
1975, Congress explicitly stated that “the standard [under § 5] can
only be fully satisfied by determining on the basis of the facts
found by the Attorney General [or the District Court] to be true
whether the ability of minority groups to participate in the political process and to elect their choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change affecting voting . . . .”212

From this passage, the Court created the following standard: “the
purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure
changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of
the electoral franchise.”213 On this view, a section 5 inquiry would focus on the retrogressive effect of the plan under review and whether
people of color were worse off than under the baseline as established
by the previous plan. Yet, almost in passing, the Court offered what
seemed an important addendum: even if a plan is ameliorative in nature, it “cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so
discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.”214 That is, unless the plan violates the Fifteenth Amendment.215
208. See id. at 402.
209. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
210. Id. at 132.
211. Id. at 139.
212. Id. at 141 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-196, at 60 (1975)) (alteration in original)
(emphasis added).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Keeping with its newfound posture of narrow interpretations of the Act, the Court
managed to even restrict this seemingly straightforward and logical reading of the law. In
Bossier Parish II, the Court remarked: “it is entirely clear that the statement in Beer was
pure dictum: The Government had made no contention that the proposed reapportionment
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Under this standard, the Court looked to the previous plan,
enacted in 1961, and compared it to the plan under review. Under
the 1961 plan, people of color did not have any majorities in any of
the districts; yet, under the reviewed 1971 plan, they would have one
and maybe two such districts. From these facts, the Court concluded
that the reviewed plan did not violate the effects prong of the preclearance requirement.
This is a questionable conclusion; at best, and as Justice Marshall
underscored in dissent, it is a contested reading of the legislative history and the statutory language.216 One searches in vain for support
through the congressional hearings. The House hearings in 1975
never mentioned the concept of retrogression as the standard under
which to measure the effects inquiry under section 5, and neither did
the 1971 House hearings by the Civil Rights Oversight Subcommittee, from which the 1975 House Report drew its retrogression language.
To be sure, the Court wrote that Congress “explicitly stated” its
understanding of the preclearance standard as one of retrogression.
But that is simply untrue. Here is what Congress explicitly did: in
the spring of 1971, it held hearings on “The Enforcement and Administration of the Voting Rights Act,” during which myriad references
to section 5 were offered. Tellingly, none of these references made use
of the retrogression language. In January 1972, this same committee
issued a report, “Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in
Mississippi,” where it recommended that the Department of Justice
step up its preclearance responsibilities, “particularly where the
change would have a substantial impact on the voting rights of many
people.”217
As for the preclearance standard, the Report explained that it “is
not fully satisfied by an indication that the administration of the
change affecting voting will be impartial or neutral.”218 Only then did
the Report go on to state the language later borrowed by the 1975
Report and ultimately by the Court majority in Beer: the standard is
whether the ability of people of color to participate in the political
process and elect the representatives of their choice is “augmented,
diminished, or not affected by the change affecting voting.”219 On its
at issue was unconstitutional. And though we have quoted the dictum in subsequent cases,
we have never actually applied it to deny preclearance.” 528 U.S. 320, 338 (2000) (citation
omitted).
216. Beer, 425 U.S. at 146 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court’s conclusion “finds no support in the language of the statute and disserves the legislative purposes behind § 5”).
217. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS OVERSIGHT (SUBCOMM. NO. 4) OF THE H.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 92ND CONG., REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT OF 1965 IN MISSISSIPPI 14 (Comm. Print 1972).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 14-15.
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face, it is not altogether clear how the Beer majority arrives at the retrogression standard from this paragraph taken as a whole. And it
gets better, for the majority left out the best part. Right after the ellipses, the Court didn’t think necessary to keep the following passage: “in view of the political, sociological, economic, and psychological circumstances within the community proposing the change.”220 So
here is the relevant passage, in full:
[The] standard [under § 5] can only be fully satisfied by determining on the basis of the facts found by the Attorney General [or the
District Court] to be true whether the ability of minority groups to
participate in the political process and to elect their choices to
office is augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change
affecting voting in view of the political, sociological, economic, and
psychological circumstances within the community proposing
the change.221

With the added language, the passage might be said to offer support for the lower court’s opinion in Beer, not the Court majority. But
the Court seemed intent in narrowing the scope of the preclearance
inquiry, and contrary legislative history—or even the fact that the litigants themselves did not think to argue for the standard as the
Court ultimately understood it in their briefs—would not stand in
its way.
Beer is also remarkable for the way in which the district court’s
analysis of the substantial meaning of section 5 differed from that of
the Supreme Court. Judge Robinson’s opinion is expansive, nuanced,
and arguably more faithful to Congress’s expansive views of the purpose behind the Act than Justice Stewart’s narrow opinion for the
Court. During the 1975 debates over extension of the Act, for example, the 94th Congress explicitly recognized that questions of representation and political fairness are difficult questions, and the question of discrimination in the political process was then a question of
vote dilution.222 In this vein, it is clear that Congress in 1975 would
side with Judge Robinson’s opinion over Justice Stewart’s. But that
is one beauty of having five votes on the Court—one need not worry
about being right. And, as for reading the statute narrowly, this
would not be the last time.
C. Retrogression to the End: The Bossier Parish Cases
Move the story ahead a generation, to the attempt by the Bossier
Parish School Board to redraw its new district lines. The Board’s
220. Id. at 15.
221. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added).
222. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Rethinking Section 5, in THE
FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 38, 46-49 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006).
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plan, modeled after a previously approved plan, was denied preclearance by the Department of Justice because a plan presented to the
Board by the NAACP had been able to create two majority black districts, whereas the submitted plan had none. More specifically, the
Attorney General had objected to the Board’s plan because, as required by its own regulations, she must withhold preclearance when
“ ‘necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended Section 2.’ ”223 On
appeal, the lower court precleared the plan,224 and the Supreme
Court ultimately faced two separate questions: whether a violation of
section 2 demands a denial of preclearance under section 5; and
whether the Attorney General must preclear a plan enacted with discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. The following Sections examine the Court’s answers to these questions. As before, these cases
are instructive for how the Court reaches its conclusions. This is aggressive and creative statutory interpretation with a vengeance.
1. Uncoupling Section 2 from Section 5
In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish I), the
Court answered the first question—whether a section 2 violation demands a denial of preclearance under section 5—in the negative.225
To the Court, making a violation of section 2 a basis for denying preclearance under section 5 would mean that the Department of Justice
“would routinely attempt to avail themselves of this new reason for
denying preclearance.”226 This would mean that “for all intent and
purposes”227 the standard of section 2 would replace the standard of
section 5, and the retrogression inquiry would be replaced by a vote
dilution inquiry. The Court soundly rejected this position, for it contradicted existing doctrine and further increased the “serious federalism costs already implicated by § 5.”228
This is a debatable conclusion, for it elevates the retrogression inquiry above the structure of the Act and the intent of Congress. On
the first point, it is clear that section 2 was intended as a restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment229 and the bill as a whole was
aimed at enforcing the same Amendment. In turn, section 5 was intended to prevent states from violating the Fifteenth Amendment in
ways that Congress could not foresee in 1965. Or as Armand Derfner

223. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 476 (1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
224. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434 (D.D.C. 1995).
225. Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 474 (1997).
226. Id. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 480 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995)).
229. See To Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Report of Proceedings of Senate Unpublished Hearing on S. 1564 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. Vol. I, 4 (1965).
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explained during the 1971 Hearings, “Section 5 was a look down the
road to prevent, in advance, stratagems whose nature was unknown
but which Congress knew would be forthcoming when literacy tests
were abolished.”230 As enacted in 1965, then, it must be the case that
section 5 would incorporate section 2, for the crux of the preclearance
requirement was preventing future violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment as codified under section 2. Put another way, section 5
was not concerned with the applicable standards under section 2 as
much as with the enactment of electoral provisions that would violate the Fifteenth Amendment. And, so long as section 2 was a restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment, section 5 would by definition
incorporate section 2. This argument has not only the legislative
record on its side, but logic—and perhaps experience—as well.
In fairness, the 1982 Amendments might be understood as altering this reading of the Act. Yet, in fact, the congressional reaction to
City of Mobile does not affect the larger argument. It is worth noting,
first and foremost, that Congress was responding to yet another narrow reading of the statutory language; in City of Mobile v. Bolden,231
the Court understood section 2 as Congress had understood it: as a
restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment. This meant, as the Court
underscored, that the standard under section 2 would be one of
discriminatory intent, rather than the more flexible and forgiving
standard of discriminatory effect. Congress soon altered this reading
of section 2 in 1982, uncoupling the statutory requirement from
its constitutional anchor and requiring a finding of discriminatory effect instead.
To the Court, the 1982 Amendment made all the difference in the
world. On their original rendition, the target of sections 2 and 5 was
the same: racial discrimination in voting, both in the present and into the future. In amending the Act, however, section 2 ceased to
simply restate the constitutional standard as the Court understood
it. This had grave repercussions for the section 5 inquiry and the argument that section 5 incorporated a section 2 inquiry, according to
the Court in Bossier Parish I. Namely, it would shift the preclearance
inquiry from nonretrogression to vote dilution and call into question
the Beer nonretrogression standard. It would also raise the already
serious “federalism costs” exacted by section 5 and in so doing might
push the Act to the brink of unconstitutionality. Tellingly, the Court
also remained unimpressed by the Attorney General’s regulations,
which interpreted section 5 as requiring a denial of preclearance if in
violation of section 2, and by considerations of public policy, which
230. The Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 255 (1971).
231. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).

736

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:697

counseled against a grant of preclearance for electoral changes that
would ultimately violate section 2.232
These arguments must be read in the context of the times and the
Court’s dissatisfaction with the Department of Justice’s handling of
its preclearance responsibilities.233 To the Court, the Department of
Justice had pushed its reading of the Act—a reading that the Court
understood as one of maximizing majority-minority districts—too far
and ultimately rendered the resulting state actions unconstitutional.
Hence, section 2 had ceased to be a measure of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Instead, it had become a tool of public policy and the
yardstick for what a proper structure of representation would look
like.234 On this view, it is easy and perhaps unavoidable to conclude
that section 5 does not incorporate section 2.
It must be noted, however, how this posture comes in direct tension with the classic voting rights decisions of the 1960s and the
Court’s forgiving interpretations of congressional power. Under Katzenbach v. Morgan,235 for example, the Court allowed Congress room
to interpret rights under the Fourteenth Amendment beyond what
the Court itself would recognize. Such an argument under the Morgan power would mean that Congress could interpret the Fifteenth
Amendment under section 2 of the Act more expansively than the
Court allowed in City of Mobile. On this view, section 5 would still
incorporate section 2 under Congress’s reading of a constitutional violation under the Amendment. But the Court was not interested in
this argument. Once Congress offered a different reading of the
Amendment through section 2 of the Act, section 5 could no longer be
used to enforce section 2 into the future.236
Regardless of one’s stance about the Court’s views on congressional power, it is also intriguing how the Court spends so little time—if
any—sorting through the legislative materials and how selective the
Court chooses to be when doing so. In this vein, recall how in Beer
the Court was much too willing to ground the doctrine on its debatable reading of the House report. Yet, in Bossier Parish, the Court
proved unwilling to accept language from the House and Senate Reports that, according to Justice Stevens and anyone willing to engage
the Reports at all, unequivocally expressed a congressional intent to
incorporate section 2 within the preclearance dictates of section 5.
232. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 483-85.
233. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 917-18; Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1366
(S.D. Ga. 1994) (contending that by the third round of submissions from Georgia to the Department of Justice, “[i]t was now clear to the General Assembly that preclearance would
not be forthcoming without adopting this raison d’être of the max-black proposals” and that
“[t]his goal dominated the creation of the third Georgia submission” (citation omitted)).
234. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891-93 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
235. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
236. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 481-82.
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According to the Senate Report, for example, “[i]n light of the
amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also
follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate
section 2.”237 In a subsequent report four years later, a House subcommittee similarly concluded that “it is a proper interpretation of
the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to use section 2 standards in the course of making section 5 determinations.”238 But the
Court was not interested in such technical matters. Its questionable
adoption of the retrogression standard in Beer ruled the day.
2. Turning the Act on its Head: Preclearing Discrimination
And two years later, in Bossier Parish II,239 the retrogression
standard ruled the day again. The question this time was whether
the Department of Justice must preclear a redistricting plan enacted
with discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose. Unsurprisingly,
the Court also answered this question in narrow fashion, construing
the language of the statute as requiring a denial of preclearance under the purpose prong of section 5 only for retrogressive dilution.240
After Bossier Parish II, the retrogression standard would apply not
only to the discriminatory effects inquiry, but to the question of discriminatory purpose as well.
The best that can be said for this reading of the statute is that it
was “outlandish.”241 The Court began by looking to the relevant language, under which a covered jurisdiction must show that its proposed change “ ‘does not have the purpose and will not have the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.’ ”242 From this language, the argument was disarmingly simple: if
the effect prong of the statute required a retrogression inquiry, the
Court concluded that it must interpret the purpose prong similarly
since, “[a]s we have in the past, we refuse to adopt a construction
that would attribute different meanings to the same phrase in the
same sentence, depending on which object it is modifying.”243 Thus,
following Beer, retrogression would become the hallmark of the preclearance inquiry.

237. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 12 n.31 (1982) (cited in Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 505-06
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
238. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE H. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 99TH CONG., REPORT ON VOTING RIGHTS ACT: PROPOSED SECTION 5
REGULATIONS 5 (Comm. Print 1986).
239. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
240. See id. at 328.
241. Id. at 360 (Souter, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 328 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1965)).
243. Id. at 329.
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This is an outlandish conclusion because it does not even pretend
to comport with the statute’s structure and Congress’s intent. The
reason for including a preclearance requirement, according to Attorney General Katzenbach, was to subject “the State which had been
discriminating in the past . . . to some kind of limitations as to any
new legislation that it might propose.”244 Or, as he explained during
the Senate hearings, the preclearance requirement “is an attempt to
prevent new laws which would frustrate the objectives of Congress
here.”245 During his testimony in front of the House subcommittee,
Joseph Rauh explained the need for the preclearance requirement
as follows:
You are about, I take it, to pass legislation to remedy previous
discrimination. All you are saying here is, “We are not going to
permit-new evasive devices, we are going to freeze the situation as
it is today unless new tests have been brought to court and found
to be nondiscriminatory.”
I would say this provision is simply self-defense of Congress. The
States you are now seeking to prevent from discriminating—this is
a way of preventing those States from finding a new method of discrimination. I think this is a necessary part of the self-defense of
the bill you are about to enact.246

If section 5 stood for anything at all in the eyes of the 89th Congress, it would be the view that the Attorney General must not preclear electoral changes that discriminated on the basis of race. Nothing that Congress did during the debates of 1969, 1975, or 1982 refutes this central premise of the Act.
Yet to the Court, “this is simply an untenable construction of the
text.”247 Not only is the Court’s reading of the Act necessitated by the
language of the statute, the Court argues, but a contrary reading of
the purpose prong as reaching nonretrogressive vote dilution practices “would also exacerbate the ‘substantial’ federalism costs that the
preclearance procedure already exacts, perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about § 5’s constitutionality.”248 And this might really be
the crux of the matter, irrespective of any congressional intent. Had
Congress really intended to reach nonretrogressive state actions
through the purpose prong of section 5, the Court suggests that this
would be unconstitutional.
To be as charitable as possible, the Court’s position simply makes
no sense. Why couldn’t Congress determine that a purpose inquiry
could precede the implementation of a statute in covered jurisdic244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 60.
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 172.
1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 399.
Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 329.
Id. at 336 (citation omitted).
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tions? The Court does not say. For support, it cites Miller v. Johnson’s admonition that the Department of Justice’s maximization policy extends beyond the reach of the statute and is in direct tension
with constitutional norms.249 But this hardly offers any persuasive
support. And further, the retrogression standard was not a concession to any “ ‘substantial’ federalism costs,”250 but rather a simple
matter of statutory interpretation and legislative intent. To suggest
that the adoption of any standard other than retrogression would
render the Act unconstitutional is a baffling proposition, and the
Court does not spend any time defending this claim.
In the end, the Court offered a lawyerly brief, full of technical arguments and distinguished cases. If a precedent seemed to stand in
its way, its conclusion would be “nothing more than an ex necessitate
limitation upon the effect prong in the particular context of annexation,”251 or the case would “involve[] an unusual fact pattern,”252 or
contrary language would be “pure dictum.”253 Such is the beauty of a
Court majority and a willingness to reach a particular outcome; counter arguments and contrary cases seldom offer enough resistance.
D. The Last Straw?: Georgia v. Ashcroft
If Beer and the Bossier Parish cases show the beauty of counting
to five, a recent case, Georgia v. Ashcroft,254 shows a different kind of
beauty: if one waits long enough, legal doctrine is likely to come full
circle. In Georgia, the Court offered its latest examination of the retrogression standard. This time around, the standard took on a loose
yet nuanced—and some might say worthless255—persona. The doctrinal terrain prior to Georgia bears repeating: a voting change that
discriminates against voters of color must be precleared if nonretrogressive.256 In fact, the retrogression inquiry does not involve how
unconstitutional the challenged plan may be; it only involves whether the plan “preserves ‘current minority voting strength.’ ”257 The
Court in Bossier Parish II reached this conclusion on its idiosyncratic

249. See id. (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926-27 (1995)).
250. See id.
251. Id. at 330 (referring to City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975)).
252. Id. at 339 (referring to City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S.
462 (1987)).
253. Id. at 338 (referring to language in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)).
254. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
255. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 36 (2004) (complaining that the Supreme Court seemed
poised to “gut[] section 5” in Georgia v. Ashcroft).
256. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 341.
257. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 477 (quoting City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125,
134 n.10 (1983)).
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reading of the statutory language.258 Had the Court focused on the
legislative history, the result would have been different.
Be that as it may, Georgia is important for the way in which the
Court can be understood as connecting the inquiry back to the concerns raised by Congress a generation before. Consider first the inquiry as the Court understood it: to determine what an “ ‘effective
exercise of the electoral franchise’ ”259 means. To the Court, this inquiry “depend[ed] on an examination of all the relevant circumstances, such as the ability of voters to elect their candidate of choice,
the extent of the minority group’s opportunity to participate in the
political process, and the feasibility of creating a nonretrogressive
plan.”260 This was a totality of circumstances inquiry, the Court explained, and a flexible and forgiving inquiry to boot. No one factor
would be determinative and, in specific reference to districting plans,
jurisdictions would retain much flexibility in choosing which theory
of representation to reflect in their plans.261
One way to read the Georgia case is, as Justice Souter read it, as
leaving nothing of the preclearance inquiry as Congress must have
envisioned it.262 Consider in this vein the words of Attorney General
Katzenbach during the Senate hearings on the need for preclearance:
It occurred to us that there are other ways in which States can
discriminate, and we have had experience with State legislative efforts in other areas, for example, limiting the registrars to very
short periods of time, or the imposition of either very high poll taxes or property taxes which would have the effect of denying or abridging rights guaranteed under the 15th Amendment, that kind of
law should be covered, too.
This was put in with an effort of not letting a State legislature
continue past practices of discrimination, preventing that or subjecting that to judicial review, somewhat the same way that State
reapportionment plans are subjected to judicial review in order to
determine their constitutionality.263

If this is in fact what the Johnson administration and the 89th
Congress had in mind for the preclearance inquiry, then clearly there
is very little left of it. Under modern doctrine, the courts must preclear even those plans that are found to discriminate against people of
color; and under Georgia, reviewing courts must read the facts flexibly and forgivingly, making a finding of retrogression even more un-

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 328-33.
Georgia, 539 U.S. at 479.
Id.
See id. at 482.
See id. at 495 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 237.
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likely than originally presumed. Under the law as it now stands, few
plans will fail to gain preclearance.
Yet Georgia has a silver lining as well. Recall that in Allen, the
Court offered an expansive view of the right to vote and the coverage
of the Act, recasting the preclearance inquiry as inter alia a dilution
inquiry. And in Beer, the lower court similarly offered a broader view
of the political culture of New Orleans, which made a finding of racial discrimination in voting more likely. Georgia takes us back to
these cases, if obliquely so, and to the 1975 congressional hearings.
The issue then was one of political power and full and effective participation in the political process. These are the same issues that
permeate Georgia’s majority opinion.
I do not wish to be misunderstood, however; I agree with Justice
Souter’s dissent that this view of retrogression empties section 5 of
any remaining substantive content. Looking back to the early congressional debates and the clear goals of the Act, and when thinking
about the ways in which political actors used both the preclearance
requirement and the Fourteenth Amendment for political purposes
as seen in the 1990s in North Carolina,264 Texas,265 and Georgia,266 to
name a few leading examples, this might not be such a bad thing after all. The policy choices seem clear: exalting Beer and its retrogression inquiry as the standard of choice or expanding the preclearance
inquiry under Section 5 and thus affording political actors more discretion to accommodate any and all relevant districting factors as
needed. When all the evidence is in, I have a hard time faulting the
Court for following the latter approach.
V. HEEDING THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: NAMUDNO AS A CASE STUDY
The history of the Voting Rights Act is thus a story of deference to
Congress on questions of constitutional law and aggressive and creative interpretations of the language of the statute. The statute remains an exercise of congressional powers, but the Court holds the
final word on what the terms of the statute might mean, often in
complete disregard of anything Congress might have possibly intended. The recent amendments and extension of the Voting Rights
Act threatened to break free from this story. The case was NAMUDO
v. Holder. But in the end, it was only more of the same.

264. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I), 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Shaw
v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
265. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900 (1995).
266. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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A. More of the Same: Deference
Days after President Bush signed the proposed bill into law,
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One
(“NAMUDNO”) challenged the constitutionality of this newest extension of the Act in federal district court.267 The arguments were familiar ones. For example, NAMUDNO complained that the preclearance
requirements as applied to the district were “disproportionate to the
original conditions that caused Texas to be covered by § 5,”268
over-inclusive,269 a punishment that was both incongruous and
irrational,270 a “badge of shame”271 on covered jurisdictions, “costly
and burdensome,”272 and “a burdensome imposition on the sovereign
rights of political subdivisions in covered jurisdictions.”273 While
saying this, NAMUDNO recognized that the Court had upheld
the constitutionality of the Act numerous times. But at the time of
these challenges, “the conditions justifying preclearance were still
very recent.”274 Continuation of the preclearance requirement a generation later was thus “both arbitrary and irrational . . . and, worse,
under the same coverage formula established in a bygone era.”275
“Times have changed,” NAMUDNO concluded, “and § 5 should now
be struck down as unconstitutional, either on its face, or as applied to
the district.”276
The three-judge panel rejected these arguments and unanimously
upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The constitutional arguments
were the main attraction and they occupied the majority of the
court’s attention. The court first settled on South Carolina v. Katzenbach and its rationality test—as opposed to City of Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test—as the proper standard for evaluating
the work of Congress.277 Consequently, the court spent the bulk of the
opinion answering the following questions:
how do the nature and magnitude of the racial discrimination in
voting revealed in the 2006 legislative record compare to the conditions documented by Congress in 1975, and is the 2006 record suf-

267. See Plaintiff’s Complaint at 1, NAMUDNO v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221
(D.D.C. 2008) (No. 1:06-cv-01384).
268. Id. at 5.
269. See id. at 6.
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 7.
273. Id. at 6.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. In its amended complaint, the District argued instead that “§ 5 cannot now be
constitutionally applied to the district.” Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 6,
NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (No. 1:06-cv-01384).
277. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 241-46.
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ficiently comparable to the 1975 record for us to conclude that
Congress again acted rationally when it extended section 5 for
another twenty-five years?278

Put another way: has the Act accomplished the ends it sought to accomplish or does the need for these “stringent”279 and “inventive”280
measures still exist?
The court answered these questions by looking to the same evidentiary sources accepted by the Supreme Court in City of Rome: racial disparities in registration, number of minority elected officials,
and preclearance objections.281 In addition, the NAMUDNO court also
considered the following: “more information request” letters from the
Attorney General, judicial preclearance suits, section 5 enforcement
actions, section 2 litigation, appointment of federal election observers, the existence of racially polarized voting, and evidence of section
5’s deterrent effect.282 Taken as a whole, this evidence, coupled with
the deference owed Congress under the Katzenbach standard, led the
court to conclude the following:
[W]e see no constitutional basis for rejecting Congress’s considered
judgment that “[d]espite the substantial progress that has been
made, the evidence before the Committee resembles the evidence
before Congress in 1965 and the evidence that was present again
in 1970, 1975, [and] 1982”—evidence the Supreme Court twice
found sufficient to justify section 5.283

The panel’s opinion in NAMUDNO was well-crafted, thorough,
and fair on both the law and the facts. It also took for granted the
one question that scholars and commentators must confront head on:
will the Supreme Court approach the work of Congress in 2006 with
the same deference and humility that it approached analogous work
in South Carolina and City of Rome? The NAMUDNO panel certainly
thought so. It remained to be seen whether the Court would continue
to treat the work of Congress with the same deference.
For a telling example, consider what I took to be the most important question for both the panel and for the Supreme Court on appeal. Aside from a vocal critical minority, few disputed the extreme
nature of the problem as it existed in 1965, the “exceptional conditions” that justified such an “uncommon exercise of Congressional
power.”284 Moving the story ahead forty-one years, this must mean,
278. Id. at 247.
279. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
280. Id. at 327.
281. See NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 247-54.
282. See id. at 247, 254-65.
283. Id. at 266-67 (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at
6 (2006)).
284. South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 334.
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according to the plaintiffs in NAMUDNO, that “Congress could not
permissibly [extend section 5] with no showing that [the] extraordinary conditions [of 1965] persist in modern times.”285 To the plaintiffs, such evidence does not exist; but instead, as they point out, the
complete opposite is true: Congress offered numerous examples that
“negate the existence of extraordinary circumstances like those existing in 1965.”286 These included the following: for seven covered states,
blacks registered at a higher rate than the national average;287 in
Texas, a higher registration rate for blacks (68.4) than for whites
(61.5); in California, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas, a higher registration and turnout rate for blacks than for whites
in the 2004 election;288 and significant increases in the numbers of
Black elected officials, both nationally and in the six states originally
covered under the Act.289
Supporters of the Act must concede the force of this argument. If
the Act was justified on the strength of “exceptional conditions,” how
much leeway would Congress be granted to extend the legislation
once these conditions begin to decline? To the NAMUDNO panel,
however, this was an argument that it could easily dispose of: “in
City of Rome, while acknowledging minority political progress since
1965, the Court still accepted Congress’s judgment that extension of
section 5’s preclearance requirement was ‘necessary . . . to promote
further amelioration of voting discrimination.’ ”290 But this might be
too easy. Consider the original argument from City of Rome in full:
It must not be forgotten that in 1965, 95 years after ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment extended the right to vote to all citizens regardless of race or color, Congress found that racial discrimination in
voting was an “insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.” In adopting the Voting Rights
Act, Congress sought to remedy this century of obstruction by shifting “the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the
evil to its victims.” Ten years later, Congress found that a 7-year extension of the Act was necessary to preserve the “limited and fragile”
achievements of the Act and to promote further amelioration of voting discrimination. When viewed in this light, Congress’ considered
determination that at least another 7 years of statutory remedies
285. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment with Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 47, NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d
221 (No. 1:06-cv-01384) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369
n.6 (2001); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997)).
286. Id.
287. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 8 (2006)).
288. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 8).
289. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 18).
290. NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 246 (quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 182 (1980) (alteration in original) (emphasis added)).
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were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive
voting discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable. The extension of the Act, then, was plainly a constitutional method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment.291

In 1980, the Court could write that seven more years of coverage
were justified in light of ninety-five years of evasion. Also, the
achievements in 1975 were considered “limited and fragile,”292 and
further amelioration of voting discrimination was needed. The question for today is not whether City of Rome already decided this issue,
but rather, how much evidence the Court would need in order to
uphold the Act as a constitutional exercise of congressional powers.
City of Rome only decided that in 1975, Congress could rationally
reach such a determination on the facts then in existence. Whether
the modern Court would similarly decide this question on the facts as
they exist today was an entirely different question. The real question
in NAMUDNO—to my mind the only question—was whether the Roberts Court would approach the constitutionality of the Act in a similarly deferential and modest posture.
The early signals from the Court were not promising. At oral argument, the conservative Justices made clear their misgivings about
the constitutionality of the Act. Commentators generally assumed
that the Act was in trouble.293
But as could be predicted by the history of the Act, the Court
evaded the constitutional question altogether.294 To be sure, the
Court took the time to remind us about all the things that place the
constitutionality of the Act in peril. For example: things have improved;295 the Act departs radically from the “fundamental principle
of equal sovereignty” among the states;296 the federalism concerns;297
and the fact that the rationality of the coverage formula has not
changed for over thirty years.298 Mindful of all these things, the Court
offered a reassuring note to those who count on the Justices to protect us from overreaching majorities: the Court was evading the constitutional question, but this did not mean that the Court was
shrinking from carrying out its traditional duties.299 Instead, the
Court was only invoking its constitutional avoidance doctrine, which

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 181-82 (citations omitted).
Id. at 182.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009).
Id. at 2511-12.
Id. at 2512.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2513.
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counsels against deciding cases on constitutional grounds when there
is “some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.”300
NAMUDNO would appear to be an uneventful, run-of-the-mill
case. This is partially true. Yet NAMUDNO is a case of far greater
import, and its real story lies elsewhere. At the heart of the case is
not the fact that the Court avoided the constitutional inquiry, but
how it strained the text of the statute and the intent of Congress in
order to reach its desired conclusion. In other words, the real story of
NAMUDNO is how far the Court was willing to go to do, in the end,
what it has always done. The next Section situates the case within
the larger history of the Act.
B. On the Art of Reading Statutes to Reach a Desired Result
The Utility District pressed two alternative arguments to the
Court.301 The first, and the big prize, sought a ruling on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. Commentators and pundits alike
braced for the worst, but the Court refused to take that step, siding
instead with the District on its second argument: that under the bailout provisions of the Act, the District should be allowed to break free
from the demands of the statute once and for all.302 This was a surprising conclusion to many. For example, a news account of the oral
argument explained the questioning as follows:
Gregory S. Coleman, a lawyer for the district, began his argument
with a relatively modest request — that the district be allowed to
“bail out” of Section 5 coverage.
But the possibility of a ruling on that or another narrow ground
did not seem to attract much interest from the justices.303

The moment we had all been waiting for was finally here, the main
attraction. We would know once and for all whether the federalism
revolution had enough traction to bring down the crown jewel of the
civil rights movement. The conventional wisdom posited the Justices
as intent on striking down the Act once and for all.
Instead, the Court stuck to its old script. That it set aside the constitutional issue for another day should not be surprising; anyone
paying attention to the history of the Act could have surmised as
much. The surprising move appears to be in the execution: put as
charitably as possible, the Court interpreted the bailout language in
question to the limits of plausible statutory construction, far beyond
anything the text said or Congress might have intended. The Court
wanted to be rid of this case, and eight Justices agreed on a way to do
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Id. at 2508.
Id. at 2516.
Liptak, supra note 23.
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so. In so doing, this aspect of NAMUDNO also fits squarely within
the history of the Act.
The bailout question did not appear difficult. In order for the District to be able to apply for bailout, it must be considered either a
state or a political subdivision under the Act.304 The District was
clearly not a state, so the case hinged on whether the District could
be considered a “political subdivision covered ‘as a separate unit.’ ”305
Under the terms of the statute, a political subdivision is “ ‘any county
or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted
under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include
any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.’ ”306 On these terms, the lower court in NAMUDNO concluded
that the District could not be considered a political subdivision under
the Act and thus denied its request to bailout.307 That court based
this decision on the language of the statute, the legislative history,
and established regulations from the Attorney General.308
In light of these arguments, commentators believed that the bailout argument would not go far.309 They were wrong—and by a wide
margin. In its 8-1 opinion, the Court sided with the District on its
statutory claim, concluding that the District may in fact pursue the
bailout option.310 Tellingly, the Court did not discuss the textual argument offered by the lower court, nor did it look to the legislative
history of the regulations by the Attorney General. These materials
strongly suggested that the District could not bail out, as only states
or political subdivisions (as the term is defined by section 14(c)(2) of
the statute) could do so. But these were only minor inconveniences,
which the Court easily cast aside. Instead, the Court looked to dicta
from a prior case, as well as “the structure of the Voting Rights Act”
and the “underlying constitutional concerns,” all of which together
“compel a broader reading” of the statute.311
I could offer a detailed examination of the Court’s construction of
the bailout provision in NAMUDNO, but to do so would be to mislead
the reader. Consider in this vein the following analysis by Justice
Scalia and compare it with the Court’s opinion not only in
NAMUDNO but in just about every case where the Court has interpreted the language of the Act:
304. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2513.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 2514 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2)).
307. NAMUNDO v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 221, 234-35 (D.D.C. 2008).
308. Id. at 231-35.
309. See Adam Liptak, Justices Retain Oversight by U.S. on Voting, N.Y. TIMES, June
23, 2009, at A1 (citing scholars who concluded that the bailout argument was “improbable”
and implausible), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/us/23scotus.html.
310. NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2508.
311. Id. at 2514.
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The starting point of the analysis [was] Supreme Court cases, and
the new issue [was] presumptively decided according to the logic
that those cases expressed, with no regard for how far that logic,
thus extended, has distanced us from the original text and understanding. Worse still, however, it is known and understood that if
that logic fails to produce what in the view of the current Supreme
Court is the desirable result for the case at hand, then, like good
common-law judges, the Court will distinguish its precedents, or
narrow them, or if all else fails overrule them, in order that the
Constitution might mean what it ought to mean.312

Justice Scalia has in mind constitutional cases, but the logic applies
with equal force to statutory cases as well. In fact, it fits almost perfectly. That the author of the preceding passage is none other than
Justice Scalia makes the argument particularly poignant and deliciously ironic.
The real lesson of NAMUDNO lies precisely here. The details of
the case are ultimately unimportant. Of far greater import is the fact
that this case fits squarely within a tradition of deference to Congress on constitutional questions and creative decisionmaking on
questions of statutory interpretation. This case is thus a replay of the
Katzenbach cases and Bossier Parrish, Beer, City of Rome, and Monterey County. To focus too much attention on the interpretive questions at the heart of the case is to miss the real lessons of the Voting
Rights Act in court. It is to these lessons that the next Part turns.
VI. MAKING SENSE OF THE ACT
In the aftermath of the NAMUDNO case, election law scholars
will find much to write about and criticize from the decision. Undoubtedly, they will be right. But in focusing too much attention on
the case, they will miss the larger lessons and insights of the evolution of the Voting Rights Act. This Part focuses on these lessons and
insights. More specifically, it examines the paradox at the heart of
the Supreme Court’s handling of the Voting Rights Act.
Consider first the role of the federal courts in our constitutional
universe. For questions of constitutional law, the courts are guardians of the document, its text, and its spirit. The standard citation
is Chief Justice Marshall’s Marbury opinion and in particular the following oft-cited passage: “It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to fay [sic] what the law is.”313 As a matter of
312. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 39 (emphasis added).
313. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Curiously enough, the
Court in Miller v. Johnson supported this position the following way:
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (judicial power cannot be shared
with Executive Branch); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S, 1 Cranch [sic] 137, 177
(1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
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first principles, they need not defer to anyone, and their conclusions
are not subject to any kind of review.
To be sure, this view of the federal judiciary has been the subject
of criticism and important counter-stories from the time of the founding; this is an old debate,314 and I do not mean to suggest otherwise.
But this is a debate with a clear winner: the judiciary has the sole
authority to interpret and defend the Constitution. Judicial supremacy—“the notion that judges have the last word when it comes
to constitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine
the meaning of the Constitution for everyone”315—has “become
the norm.”316
In contrast, statutes clearly belong to the legislatures, and the
role of the courts in interpreting these texts is far more circumscribed and narrow. Here, the courts must seek to understand the
text as its authors understood it, with an eye toward carrying out the
wishes—the intent, perhaps?—of the authoring body. Whether a textualist,317 an intentionalist,318 a purposivist,319 or even a dynamic insay what the law is”); cf. [sic] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (Supreme
Court is “ultimate interpreter of the Constitution”); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 18 (1958) (“permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system” is that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution”).
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922-23 (1995).
314. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions
on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). For recent accounts that allocate interpretive
responsibilities to other branches, see, for example, Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
315. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 125 (2004).
316. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959, 964
(2004); see Rachael E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 302 (2002) (arguing that “the unmistakable trend is toward a view that all constitutional questions are
matters for independent judicial interpretation and that Congress has no special institutional advantage in answering aspects of particular questions” and that “[t]he Court has
therefore become increasingly immodest when it comes to deciding how constitutional interpretive power should be allocated”). For a response, see Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1027 (2004).
317. See SCALIA, supra note 2, at 23; Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983).
318. See Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33-39 (1985); Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800,
817 (1983).
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terpretivist,320 a judge engaged in legislative interpretation must
try to remain faithful—or at least pretend to be—to the legislative
work product. Unlike constitutional interpretation where the document belongs to the Court, statutes ultimately belong to the legislature. Statutory interpretation is an arena where legislatures
reign supreme.321
The history of the Voting Rights Act turns this familiar script on
its head. This is an area where questions of constitutional law meet
little resistance from the Justices, yet questions of statutory interpretation meet an aggressive and creative Court. With the recent extension and amendments to the Voting Rights Act in 2006,322 this paradox takes on renewed interest. This Part considers this puzzle in
two Sections. The first Section understands the paradox as an exercise in living constitutionalism. In case any doubts remained, this
Section argues that progressive scholars and jurists do not have a
monopoly on “activist” jurisprudence.
The second Section examines and tries to make sense of the few
congressional responses to the Court’s creative interpretations of the
statute. As the Court gives Congress a free pass to enact and extend
the Act into the unforeseeable future, yet rewrites the text of the Act
to its liking, how to explain the inconsistent congressional responses?
Insights from positive political theory help frame an answer yet only
deepen the puzzle. Before concluding, I offer a theory of my own.
A. Explaining the Paradox as an Exercise
in Living Constitutionalism
One answer to the paradox at the heart of the Voting Rights Act
lies implicit within the larger debate in constitutional law over the
concept of judicial supremacy. When the Court subjects the Act to
barely any scrutiny at all, it would appear that it offers Congress a
free pass in this most sensitive area. But as the Court gives with one
hand, it takes with the other. This is because Congress can never be

319. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William A. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P.
Frickey eds., 1994); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 250-51 (1986).
320. See William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1479 (1987) (arguing that statutes “should—like the Constitution and the common
law—be interpreted ‘dynamically,’ that is, in light of their present societal, political, and
legal context”).
321. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78
GEO. L.J. 281, 281 (1989) (“It is a commonplace that, apart from constitutional issues,
judges are subordinate to legislatures in the making of public policy.”).
322. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 4-5, 120 Stat. 577,
580-81 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (West Supp. 2007)).
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sure that the Court will give its words their intended meaning. In
other words, the Act means whatever the Court says it means, irrespective of congressional intent or even the language of the statute.
Seen this way, the story of the Act in Court is but an installment of
the larger story of the Court as judicially supreme. In fact, it is even
better. It is one thing to tell Congress and the President where the
limits of their powers are. It is quite another to do the work of the
policy branches for them—this is judicial activism on steroids.
This Section explores with greater depth a second answer. This is
a story where Congress accepts the role of the Court as constitutional
interpreter and which portrays the Constitution as a living document. It is also a story that turns the conventional wisdom on its head.
Begin with the debate in Congress in 1965. Note first that Congress knew the extent of the problem and how difficult it was to tailor an effective solution, as seen by its previous efforts in 1957, 1960,
and 1964. Note also that as far as Congress was concerned, this was
not a question of unavailability of power, because Congress was confident that it had the power under the Fifteenth Amendment to do
something about this problem. So the real question for Congress was
how far the substantive provisions of the bill could go.
Out of concern for overstepping constitutional bounds, the administration and members of Congress drafted a broad statute, short on
specifics and as far-reaching as they deemed constitutionally possible. In response to a question from Representative Cramer, for example, Attorney General Katzenbach explained: “If the Congressman
can suggest an effective means that covers everything that is covered
by this act and can cover other areas and still be constitutional, I am
sure that the administration would be most happy to consider that.
We don’t want discrimination anywhere.”323 The Attorney General
repeated this position often. The broad contours of the Act were
clear: to eliminate the “blight of racial discrimination in voting.”324
Some witnesses and members of Congress wished for the bill to assert far more directly the reach of the Act,325 but the legislation ultimately failed to reflect these efforts. The language remained broad
and expansive, which offered a willing interpreter room to expand
the scope of the statute as necessary.
More tellingly, the language offered the Court the means through
which to interpret section 5—and the Voting Rights Act in general—
expansively, up to the constitutional limits as the Court itself understood them. This is precisely what Congress intended: to tackle
323. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 90.
324. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
325. See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 192 (objecting to Senator Fong’s
suggestion to clarify the original section 9(a) of the Act).
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the problem aggressively, decisively, yet within traditional constitutional limits. This is a constitutional partnership in its truest sense,
with Congress, the executive branch, and the Court working together
in furthering voting rights policy. This is also a story of institutional
trust. Congress implicitly ceded to the Court some policy-making authority, trusting that the Court would further the work of Congress,
rather than thwart it.
To be fair, direct evidence for this conclusion is scarce in the early
legislative history, for Congress could not even be sure whether the
constitutionality of the Act would bear judicial scrutiny—although
Attorney General Katzenbach was very optimistic on this score.326
But Congress and the administration did make clear, time and again,
that they wished to take the substantive provisions of the Act as far
as constitutionally possible. After three recent attempts had failed to
deliver much change, they wished to attack the problem as aggressively and decisively as the Constitution permitted. The Court could
thus interpret the Act as broadly as it wished, confident in the view
that Congress would support its interpretation. Ironically, the temporary nature of the special provisions of the Act proved helpful on
this score, as Congress had many opportunities to comment on—and
demonstrate approval for—the Court’s handiwork. Hence, the strategy played out across decades and the various extensions of the Act.
The congressional response to Allen is particularly instructive.
Consider, for example, the words of Representative McCulloch, offered during the 1969 hearings:
Section 5 was intended to prevent the use of most of these devices.
But apparently the States rarely obeyed the mandate of that section, and the Federal Government was too timid in its enforcement. I hope that the case of Allen v. State Board of Elections,
decided by the Supreme Court on March 3, 1969, is the portent
of change.327

Representative McCulloch was the House minority leader and a leading voice during the 1969 debates exhorting the federal government
to do more while looking to Allen for approval. Clearly, the minority
leader understood section 5 as a broad and necessary provision.328

326. See id. at 249 (“I think if anything [his opinion about the constitutionality of the
bill] has been strengthened, Senator, because under such rigorous and learned cross examination as I have had on this point, my convictions remain the same, and I have confidence in the constitutionality of the bill.”).
327. Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 4249, H.R. 5538, and Similar Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 4 (1969).
328. Id. at 270 (“Section 5 must not be repealed or emasculated. The past 4 years have
proved that there are hundreds of ways to discriminate. Section 4 deals with literacy tests
or devices. Section 5 deals with all of the rest . . . .”).
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Far more tellingly, he remarked that thanks to Allen, “at long last after 4 years section 5 will become effective.”329
Representative McCulloch was hardly alone. Important in this regard is the way in which members of Congress referred to Allen and
Gaston County during the 1969 hearings. Aside from critics such as
Senator Ervin, who pointed to these cases as further proof that the
sunset provisions of the Act should be allowed to expire, supporters
of the Act referred to these decisions as part and parcel of the new
statutory regime. More crucially, supporters of the Act made arguments and staked positions during the 1969 hearings that made use
of Allen and Gaston County as both accepted and crucial components
of the legislation. It is also important for this argument that talk of
overturning these decisions was close to nonexistent. That Congress
held scheduled hearings so close to these decisions yet chose not to
overturn them speaks volumes about the way in which Congress understood and ultimately accepted these cases as consonant with the
mission of the Act.330
During the 1975 hearings, the debate over the Court’s expansive
interpretations of the Act was both subdued and altogether different.
As in previous hearings, some witnesses offered unqualified support
for the Court and its interpretations of the Act.331 There were also
criticisms, of course, but by this time the critics were far more focused and pointed in their choice of targets. They knew that fighting
the Act or their judicial interpretations on the merits would prove
hopeless. They still criticized the Court, to be sure, but while doing
so, they also asked Congress for guidance and much-needed clarity in
the field. This muddiness was a problem, argued Daniel McLeod,
South Carolina’s Attorney General, because “it is very difficult and a
329. Id. at 271. The Civil Rights Commission took a similar view. A Staff memorandum
dated July 8, 1969 argued that “until the Allen decision, referred to previously, it had been
unclear whether Section 5 applied to all election law changes in the covered States, or only
to those changes which dealt with voting and registration.” 1969 Senate Hearings, supra
note 21, at 52. “Because the Court has now made clear that Section 5 has a very wide
scope,” the memo continued, “States can now be expected to submit more statutes for approval.” Id.
330. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 533 (1973) (“Had Congress disagreed
with the interpretation of s 5 in Allen, it had ample opportunity to amend the statute. After extensive deliberations in 1970 on bills to extend the Voting Rights Act, during which
the Allen case was repeatedly discussed, the Act was extended for five years, without any
substantive modification of s 5.” (footnote omitted)). See also Justice Thomas’ intriguing
concurrence in Holder. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 929 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(conceding that Congress had interpreted section 5 expansively in Allen “and Congress has
reenacted § 5 subsequent to our decisions adopting that expansive interpretation”).
331. See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 35, at 641 (statement of Armand Derfner) (“The significance of section 5 did not become apparent until 1969, when the Supreme
Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections clearly stated that this section covers changes
that dilute black citizens’ votes as well as simpler devices of disenfranchisement.”); id. at
717 (statement of Parker) (“I do not want to leave the impression that the court, in the Allen case, enunciated something which the Congress did not intend.”).
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very onerous burden with the uncertainties brought into the picture
by reason of the application of the act to know which acts should be
submitted.”332 In this vein, Stone Barefield, a state representative
from Mississippi, similarly complained that the courts have interpreted the Act far beyond the intent of Congress and “so that I, as a
legislator, and so that other legislators in the affected States will
know, pleased [sic] write into the Voting Rights Act by definition
what Congress intends to cover by standard practice and procedure[].”333
For my purposes, the most interesting and perhaps most important testimony was that of Representative David Satterfield, a congressman from the Commonwealth of Virginia. He clearly took issue
with the courts and their interpretations and applications of the statute. Yet Congress was not powerless in the face of a runaway judicial system, he complained, for these were largely questions of statutory interpretation. And so he argued:
I consider it unfortunate that the act has been construed by the
courts to mean what they say it means. I believe it is time now for
Congress, by specific amendments to make clear its position and
its precise objectives, especially with regard to those court decisions which have interpreted the act. There is an opportunity now,
which should be seized, for Congress to make it clear whether it
agrees with court interpretations and where it does not to make
clear what it does mean to say by this act. I hope this committee
will render special attention to this opportunity.334

Minutes later, he repeated his request: “Frankly, I have difficulty in
finding in this act or the act’s legislative history the basis on which
the courts are making that decision. It would be my hope that this
subcommittee will address that point.”335 To which Representative
Don Edwards, the chair of the subcommittee, responded, “Well, we
will address that point.”336
But they didn’t. Representative Satterfield issued his request on
March 21st, and the committee published its report approximately
six weeks later, on May 8th.337 And curiously, not a word was written
on this issue. Instead, the report extended an approving nod toward
the Court and its interpretations of the Act, as it cited both Allen and
332. Id. at 581.
333. Id. at 707; see id. at 714 (“And that is why I have asked this committee to seriously
consider defining these standards, the practices and procedures that we are dealing with.”).
334. Id. at 730; see id. at 737 (explaining that the crux of the matter for him was
“whether or not the decisions of the courts, which to my mind have converted the objective
of this act from one to guarantee that there not be a denial of the right to vote, and not to
abridge the right to vote, to an enlargement to say that you can not dilute the effectiveness
of that vote”).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-196 (1975).
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Perkins while explaining that around the time of the 1970 amendments to the Act, the Court “gave broad interpretations to the scope
of section 5.”338 It is clear that the House was fully aware of the
Court’s broad interpretations of the statute yet uninterested in cabining them. So long as their views were in harmony, Congress need
not pay careful attention to the Court’s interpretations of the Act, no
matter how inventive or creative these might be.
Now move the story ahead, from the City of Mobile decision in
1980 and the wrongful redistricting cases of the 1990s to Bossier Parish and Georgia v. Ashcroft. These cases appear to break with the
story of the Act presented here of a Congress wishing for the Court to
interpret the Act broadly—to the constitutional limit—and of a Court
willing to do exactly that. These cases narrowed the previous interpretations of the statute to varying degrees. The break began in the
mid-1970s, with City of Richmond v. United States and Beer v. United States. After these cases, the partnership between the Court and
the political branches—and the broad judicial interpretations of the
Act—largely ended. How to understand this shift?
For an answer, go back to my reading of the early history of the
Act. In these cases, from Katzenbach and Morgan to Allen and Gaston County, the Court takes its cues from Congress and extends the
scope of the Act to the outer reaches of the law, as far as the Constitution permits. One way to understand the shift in posture only requires a different reading of the constitutional boundaries as then
understood by the Court. In other words, it only requires a view of
the Constitution as a changing and evolving document. This is a
view, more precisely yet, of a “living Constitution.”
According to Justice Scalia, the argument proceeds as follows:
“The ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of what is called The Living Constitution, a body of law that
(unlike normal statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order
to meet the needs of a changing society.”339 The “living Constitution”
argument is an argument for the Constitution as a changing and
flexible document, adaptable to changing times and circumstances.
This is an argument that places the Justices at the center of this
change, able to discern it and willing to interpret the Constitution in
ways that accommodate it.
338. Id. at 9.
339. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 38; see Melissa McNamara, Scalia Raps ‘Living Constitution,’ CBS NEWS.COM, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/14/supremecourt/
main1315619.shtml (“ ‘That’s the argument of flexibility and it goes something like this:
The Constitution is over 200 years old and societies change. It has to change with society,
like a living organism, or it will become brittle and break.’ ‘But you would have to be an
idiot to believe that.’ Scalia said. ‘The Constitution is not a living organism; it is a legal
document. It says something and doesn’t say other things.’ ”).
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To Justice Scalia, however, change and flexibility must come from
sources outside the Court: “If you think aficionados of a living Constitution want to bring you flexibility, think again . . . . You think the
death penalty is a good idea? Persuade your fellow citizens to adopt
it. You want a right to abortion? Persuade your fellow citizens and
enact it. That’s flexibility.”340 In other words, the Constitution does
not change outside the amendment process and it is not up to the
Justices to adapt it as their policy views see fit.
But life is never quite so simple. The Voting Rights Act offers an
apt example. One way to understand the early cases, from Katzenbach and Morgan to Allen and Gaston County, is precisely as I suggested earlier: the Court takes its cues from Congress and extends
the scope of the Act to the outer reaches of the law, as far as the Constitution permits. Beginning with the City of Richmond341 decision in
1975, the Court’s readings are much less constricted and inflexible.
This posture continues throughout the life of the Act. Beer and the
Bossier Parish cases serve as bookends.
To give the Court its due, it may be said that the Court is still
faithful to the original congressional directive; that is, the Court is
still interpreting the Act to the outer reaches of the Constitution. It
just so happens that these outer limits are far narrower than they
might have been. Or as the Court wrote in Bossier Parish II: to interpret section 5 of the Act as appellants contend “would also exacerbate the ‘substantial’ federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts, perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about §
5’s constitutionality.”342 As I suggested earlier, the conclusion that
section 5 does not reach discriminatory yet nonretrogressive dilutive
purposes would be unthinkable for the Warren Court, or, worse yet,
for the 89th Congress, or the 91st Congress, or the 94th Congress.
But this is not the same Constitution that we are expounding. One
way to understand the Court’s narrow interpretations of the Act is to
recognize that the Constitution changes and the Court’s interpretations have necessarily changed with it. That is to say, the Constitution might be alive after all, even for the conservative justices.
B. On the Look of a Strategic Court
The Court’s interpretations of the Act raise a second puzzle. It
stands to reason that if the Justices wish for their preferred policies
to endure, they must take into account the preferences of other insti340. Scalia Slams “Living Constitution” Theory, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 14, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,150428,00.html.
341. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
342. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000) (citing Lopez v. Monterey County, 525
U.S. 266, 282 (1999); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926-27 (1995)).
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tutions. This proposition is particularly important for questions of
statutory interpretation, where the risk of congressional override is
at its highest. But the evolution of the Voting Rights Act appears to
defy this theory. From the time the Court first interpreted the language of the statute in Allen, its decisions have been eclectic and creative implementations of the intent of Congress and the language of
the statute. These interpretations do not appear to follow a discernible pattern in terms of congressional response; while some holdings
have met much resistance from Congress, others have not. This final
Section examines this relationship.
The theory itself is easily stated, in the form of a game between
Congress, the Court, the President, and congressional committees,
acting within a range of policy choices.343 The Court begins the game
by identifying its preferred policy position. It then considers the
range of policy alternatives that might be acceptable to Congress and
the President. When the Court’s identified position is outside this
range, it presumes that its preferred position risks reversal from
Congress and the President. The Court seeks to avoid this override
by shifting its preferred position within the range acceptable to Congress and the President.
The civil rights era, from 1967 to 1990, provides a strong example
of this model.344 From 1966 to 1971, the Court was to the left of Congress on civil rights questions.345 The relevant committees—labor and
judiciary—were to the right of the Court but to the left of Congress
as a whole.346 On this configuration, the Court was truly independent
and did not need to fear a congressional override, because both the
President and the committees supported the views of the Court.347
Any legislation trying to overrule the Court had little chance of becoming law, because the congressional committees would not bring
such legislation to the floor, and if this hurdle were overcome, the
President stood ready to veto it.348
This is a way to understand Allen v. State Board of Elections, a
case that offered a very aggressive application of the work of Congress and particularly Section 5. Allen had its share of critics. But
343. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Playing the Game]; John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992); John Ferejohn & Barry R.
Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992).
344. See Eskridge, Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation, supra note 343, at 391-97.
345. Id. at 391-92.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See id.
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the picture that emerges from the 1969 hearings is that of a thankful
Congress, happy to see the Court interpret the statutes in ways that
Congress could not even foresee in 1965. Committee members were
on the side of the Court, and the full Congress followed the committee’s lead, extending the statute for another five years while refusing
to take on the Court’s expansive interpretations.349 Following Allen,
the Court extended its teachings aggressively, with the apparent
blessings of Congress in 1970.
The period between 1972 and 1986 witnessed a marked change in
the game.350 New appointments to the Court in 1975, 1981, and 1986
moved the Court sharply to the right at a time when Congress was
moving to the left.351 According to Professor Eskridge, this shift
should lead to a policy tension between Congress and the Court, as
the Court would no longer enjoy the protection of supportive congressional committees.352 The Court must predict where the current congressional preferences carefully lie; a misstep could lead to an immediate override.
The model only partially explains the Voting Rights Act cases.
The Court’s move to the right is clear enough; it began in 1975 with
City of Richmond. But the tension predicted by the model never surfaced, as the congressional response remained muted. The Court remained in charge of delineating the contours of the statute while
Congress happily acquiesced.
The next case, Beer v. United States,353 might have appeared to
change all of this. The timeline raises a few skeptical eyebrows. The
case was first argued on March 26, 1975,354 at which time Congress
was debating whether to extend the Act once more. The Court set the
case for reargument, which took place on November 12th.355 In so
doing, the Court’s decision came after the President signed the bill on
August 6th.356 The Court ultimately decided the case on March 30,
1976, at which time the retrogression standard first surfaced. Notably, the 94th Congress did not take on the Court and any of its aggressive interpretations, choosing instead to extend the Act for seven
years while adding the language provisions to the statute. The retrogression standard remained law as consonant with the intent of Congress. It remains so to this day.

349. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat.
314 (1970).
350. See Eskridge, Playing the Game, supra note 343, at 623-25.
351. See id. at 624.
352. See id. at 625.
353. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
354. Id. at 130.
355. Id.
356. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat 400 (1975).
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There is much to criticize about the Beer decision, and I did so
previously. For my purposes here, it is notable that Congress did not
take on the Court and its narrow interpretations of the Act. The tension predicted by the model never surfaced. To be fair, the City of
Richmond was argued in April and decided in June, giving Congress
very little time to respond to the Court. The 1975 hearings were
winding down and Congress had more pressing matters to attend. In
contrast, we should expect some kind of response after Beer, a decision where the Court radically altered the law. But Congress did no
such thing. Thus begging the question: after Beer, how could the
Court view itself as anything but safe from congressional override? If
Beer did not provoke a response from Congress during the 1982 debates, what would?
Four years later, Congress gave us an answer. In 1980, the Court
decided City of Mobile v. Bolden,357 which concluded that Section 2 of
the Act incorporated the constitutional intent standard.358 This case
marked a watershed in the history of the Act, as Congress overturned this holding when extending the Act for another twenty-five
years in 1982.359 This override is hard to explain in light of what
came before. To Professor Eskridge, the override fits the game as he
describes it: after 1972, increased tension between a right-of-center
Court and a more liberal Congress led to increased overrides from
Congress.360 But how to explain a lack of an override, or even a debate
in Congress, over the Beer holding, but an override of City of Mobile at
a time when, as Eskridge points out, a more conservative Presidency
offered the Court more leeway to reach conservative results?361
Deepening the puzzle, it is notable that after City of Mobile, the
Court did not alter its approach to the statute in any way, continuing
to interpret the statute the way it always had: creatively, even dynamically. Yet Congress proved uninterested once again. Whether it
was Thornburg v. Gingles,362 where the Court interpreted the newly
amended Section 2 as concomitant with the intent of Congress;363
Presley v. Etowah County Commission,364 where the Court offered a
narrow interpretation of the scope of Section 5; or Bossier Parrish I,
where the Court uncoupled section 2 of the Act from the Section 5 re-

357. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
358. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing City of Mobile).
359. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat.
131 (1982).
360. See Eskridge, Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation, supra note 343, at 393.
361. See id. at 396.
362. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
363. Id. at 48 n.15.
364. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
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trogression inquiry,365 Congress did not take on the Court in any way.
It simply did not care.
A final twist to this story came at the close of the decade and the
beginning of the next, when the Court decided both Bossier Parish
II366 and Georgia v. Ashcroft.367 If the past held to form, the Court had
nothing to worry about and Congress would leave both opinions undisturbed. Instead, Congress overrode both decisions during its most
recent extension of the Act in 2006.368
This short history raises important questions about the Court and
its interactions with Congress and the President. The remainder of
this Section focuses on one question in particular: how to explain
these responses to the Court’s work, in light of those moments when
Congress chooses not to respond? This important question deserves
more time and attention than I can give it here. This Section
sketches an answer.
The story of the Voting Rights Act is a story of social movements
and interest group politics, of evolution and gradual change, and of
the Court as a member of the national policy-making coalition. It is a
story of congressional power and federalism, of race and resistance,
of voting and trust. Ultimately, it is a story where national majorities
get their way.
The Voting Rights Act was the fourth attempt within eight years
to address the problem of race and voting in select jurisdictions. In
light of these prior efforts, the Act and its extreme and radical provisions can only make sense as a byproduct of the civil rights movement, as a result of Bloody Sunday and the resulting press coverage.369 It was time.
Once the expected challenge to the constitutionality of the Act
reached the Court on direct appeal, the institution responded as a
member of the national coalition would be expected to respond. The
Court in the Katzenbach cases deferred to Congress and the executive branch, and in so doing, it signaled its willingness to do its part
in solving the problem of racial discrimination in voting. Katzenbach
v. Morgan is particularly instructive, as existing law offered no
match for the Court’s willingness to offer Congress what amounted to
365. Bossier Parrish I, 520 U.S. 471 (1997); see supra notes 225-36 and accompanying
text (discussing Parish I).
366. 528 U.S. 320 (2000); see supra notes 239-53 and accompanying text (discussing
Parish II).
367. 539 U.S. 461 (2003); see supra notes 254-66 and accompanying text (discussing
Georgia v. Ashcroft).
368. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577, 580-81
(2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b-c (West Supp. 2007)).
369. See DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978).
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a free pass in this area. Allen and its progeny offer further proof for
this thesis. As the problems changed and the affected jurisdictions
adapted, the Court was up to the task, filling the needed statutory
gaps and expanding the Act as needed. And Congress was only too
happy for the help.
New appointments by the Nixon administration began to turn the
tide, so that by 1975 the Court for the first time interpreted the language of the statute narrowly. This was the City of Richmond case. It
was also Beer and City of Mobile. Once this shift took place, absent a
few outliers, the Court was no longer doing the work of Congress.
The 1960s coalition was no longer in charge, and the Court’s interpretations of the Act reflected this change. With a new coalition in
place, the question then was whether the Act would remain a constitutional exercise of congressional powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment. The congressional debates in 1982 and 2006 must be
understood in this context.
Once the Court broke away from the original, expansive promise
of the Act, the congressional responses to the Court are nothing more
than clear substantive disagreements about policy. In other words,
these responses are nothing but a display of Congress asserting its
will in matters of statutory interpretation. But more tellingly, this is
a story of interest group politics and the role played by the civil
rights lobby in support of the Act.370 The early years of the Act saw
the Court on the side of the coalition, and so the debates were subdued and altogether different. There was no need to respond to the
Court and its interpretations. Once the Court shifted ground and
moved away from its earlier self, the coalition responded in kind the
first time it had the chance—in 1982. The same dynamic occurred
in 2006.
In order to make sense of the Act, then, we must take the longer
view. The Court has offered creative and even radical interpretations
of the language of the statute from the moment it first confronted the
Act in the late 1960s. Congressional responses, in the form of override legislation, have only surfaced sporadically—namely, in 1982
and 2006. This is hardly a coincidence. One of the main shortcomings
of the theory of congressional overrides is the difficulties that inhere
in enacting new legislation to override the Court. The structural barriers are many and well known:
“Since Congress itself is constrained by the Executive Branch and
since institutional features of Congress such as its bicameral
structure, the committee system, and even the subcommittee sys370. See generally Dianne M. Pinderhughes, Black Interest Groups and the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act, in BLACKS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 203 (Huey
L. Perry & Wayne Parent eds., 1995).
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tem, make it difficult for Congress to overturn a Supreme Court
decision, legislative constraints provide the judiciary with a great
deal of discretion. Because of the difficulty in forecasting electoral
returns and in anticipating congressional action and because of the
extensive set of veto points that exists in the legislative policymaking process, Supreme Court justices need not always alter
their behavior in anticipation of a congressional response.”371

To this list we may add both transaction and opportunity costs.372
Passing legislation to override judicial decisions takes time away
from other activities that more directly benefit reelection efforts. Also, enacting override legislation must take the place of enacting other
types of legislation with higher salience among one’s constituents.
Taken together, these barriers and costs suggest that the risk of
override legislation will be quite low.
The Voting Rights Act overcomes this low risk of override through
the sunset provision. Originally enacted as recognition of the radical
nature of its special provisions and as a way to force Congress to revisit the need for these special provisions in the near future, the Act
originally included a five-year limit on its coverage formula. This
meant that Congress must return to this question in 1970 and consider whether the gains during this period warranted letting the Act
expire. One way to read the congressional debates in 2006 and the
extension of the Act for another twenty-five years sees Congress as
not yet satisfied that the voting rights gains of the last forty-one
years warrant expiration of the coverage formula. This is a decision
that Congress has made at select points in the history of the Act—in
1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006. This means that the sunset provision
has offered Congress not only a way to review its own work at set intervals, but to review the work of the Court as well. It is hardly coincidental that Congress has chosen to override select judicial interpretations in 1982 and 2006 and that these decisions came a few years
before the sunset hearings were set to begin. More importantly,
these sunset hearings offer all interested groups and coalitions
a built-in opportunity to come to Congress and press for their preferred interpretations.
Assuming my argument is correct, a final question immediately
arises. On the same day that the Court decided City of Mobile, it also
decided City of Rome, which upheld the constitutionality of the Act.
By this time, the Court had long split with the coalition that gave life
371. Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme
Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (2001) (quoting FORREST MALTZMAN
ET AL., STRATEGY AND JUDICIAL CHOICE: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES TO SUPREME
COURT DECISION-MAKING, IN SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST
APPROACHES 43, 48-49 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999)).
372. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 31 (1997).
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to the Act. If this story is correct, the constitutionality of the Act
hung on the balance, and the judicial deference of old would surely
give way to far more aggressive review. But City of Rome continued
with the posture of deference. How to explain this case in light of the
Court’s clear turn away from the goals of the Act? The answer lies
within the chambers of Justices Blackmun and Stevens and Chief
Justice Burger. They cast the crucial votes between the shift in the
mid-1970s and 1980. The Chief Justice’s vote is particularly curious,
because his record in civil rights cases was not terribly strong on the
side of civil rights plaintiffs, nor did he shift gradually with time, as
did Justices Blackmun and Stevens. A tentative answer is that the
Chief Justice, while willing to tinker with the minutiae of voting
rights law, proved unwilling to undo the most effective civil rights
statute in history. It would not be said that the Burger Court struck
down the Voting Rights Act. It remains to be seen whether Chief
Justice Roberts will respond similarly.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Voting Rights Act, the crown jewel of the civil rights movement, is once again at the center of the debate over the political
rights of voters of color. This is a debate about both the powers of
Congress under the Reconstruction Amendments and the substantive
voting rights of voters of color. Scholars are presently engaged in
both strands of this debate. But as this Article argues, their efforts
are ultimately misplaced. The Voting Rights Act is much too important, and the Court’s rulings far too intriguing and paradoxical, to
treat this case law as we treat all others. Rather than focus on the
doctrinal nuances of both the statute and the Reconstruction
Amendments, we must focus instead on the Court as a strategic institution and the Justices as “single-minded seekers of legal policy.”373 This is the only way, or so this Article argues, to make sense of
the history of the Act.

373. George & Epstein, supra note 24, at 324.
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